Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal
Volume 4
Number 1 Fall 2006

Article 2

1-1-2006

Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit against
the Government for American Indian Boarding
School Abuses
Andrea A. Curcio

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_race_poverty_law_journal
Part of the Law and Race Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit against the Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 4
Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 45 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_race_poverty_law_journal/vol4/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

CIVIL CLAIMS FOR UNCIVILIZED
ACTS: FILING SUIT AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT FOR AMERICAN
INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOL ABUSES
ANDREA A. CURCIO*

"We were never going to be like the white man, no matter how
hard we tried, but they forced us to try to be like the white
man.... They stripped us of our language. They stripped us of
our religious beliefs. They stripped us of our family life, our
family values. They stripped us from our culture."1

Introduction
Imagine a government that forced you to send your young
child to a distant school where the child's name, clothes and identity
were confiscated. At this "school" your child was fed bug-infested
food, lived in extremely unsanitary conditions, worked long hours
doing intense manual labor under hazardous conditions, received
little or no medical care even when suffering from painful and
potentially deadly illnesses, and routinely suffered from physical
beatings and sexual abuse. At this "school" your child was taught
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I thank my
colleagues Natsu Saito and Marjorie Girth, my research assistants Lucy Martin and Ben
Jordan, law librarian Colleen Williams, and the entire GSU law library staff. The
collective help of all these people was invaluable. Finally, I thank Georgia State
University College of Law for the research leave and research support that made this
article possible.
1. Matt Kelley, American Indians Describe School Beatings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April
24, 1999 at 2, http://www.nospank.net/n-e36.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (also on
file with the author) (quoting Jo Anna Meninick, a Yakama Indian who attended the
government-run Chemawa Indian School in Salem, Or., in the 1950s).
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that your culture and way of doing things were evil and wrong.
Your child was forbidden to worship in the way you taught. In fact,
if caught speaking your language, severe punishment, often verging
on torture, was meted out. During all this trauma, no adult
provided your child with love and comfort. You could not visit and
your child could not come home. The goal of all this was to
obliterate your way of life; to teach your child to reject everything
about you and your family and to become a different person - one
who was equipped to do menial labor for the culture that was
"educating" him or her. Imagine that this happened to almost half
of the children of your people for five consecutive generations.
Unfortunately, this is not an imaginary tale. It is the real story
of what happened to North American indigenous people. It is but
one part of history in which a settler population stole land and
lifestyle from our nation's indigenous peoples and sought to impose
its "superior" culture on the existing population. As this article
explains, the "schooling" of American-Indian children was part of a
larger genocidal attack on American Indians. 2 It was also tortious
conduct, violated treaties between the United States government
and American Indian nations, and violated international human
rights law.
The inhumane treatment of native children happened in both
the United States and Canada from the late 1800s through the 1970s
and beyond. Recently, the Canadian government has, to some
extent, recognized the evil it promulgated and has begun to allow
boarding school survivors an opportunity to bring cases to court.
This article explores whether those who survived the
institutionalization imposed upon them by the United States
government have any legal recourse.
Although some children had a relatively positive, or at least a
mixed good and bad boarding school experience, 3 thousands of
other children over many generations suffered severe physical and
emotional harm as a result of attending these schools. This article
addresses the viability of the latter group of boarding school
4
attendees' potential claims against the United States government.
2. "Genocide" as used in this article refers to government conduct in violation of
customary international law as evidenced by the Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As explained in detail infra Part III.C.1.,
international law prohibits conduct aimed at destroying a people "as such." Part III.C.1
discusses boarding school attendees' potential genocide claims.
3. See HENRIETTA MANN, CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO EDUCATION 1871-1982 (1997) 135-53;
see also DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION (1995) (discussing

students' positive and negative reactions to various aspects of boarding schooling).
4. Indian nations as well as the parents and children of boarding school attendees
also may have potential claims based upon the government's abuse and mistreatment of
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The article discusses these claims in the context of claims that seek
legal redress for large scale human rights violations, a subject that
has received considerable academic attention 5 and has been the
basis of numerous recent court cases. 6 It uses the plight of
American-Indian children to illustrate how the law can and should
address such large-scale human rights offenses.
This article
explores the limits of the law as generally implemented and it
provides the reader with opportunities to think about how the law
could be differently implemented and differently conceptualized to
remove some barriers to legal redress in large scale governmental
human rights abuse cases.
Part I begins with a brief overview of American history as it
relates to the intentional decimation of this country's indigenous
peoples. Part II discusses how American Indian boarding schools fit
into the scheme of eliminating the native population. Part III
explores various potential civil claims available to boarding school
attendees. It begins with a discussion of Tucker Act claims based
upon treaty provisions promising compensation for harms caused
by "bad men" amongst whites. The discussion of Tucker Act claims
includes an analysis of both the statute of limitations and plenary
power doctrine defenses. Following a discussion of Tucker Act
claims, this section explores a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
negligence claim based upon a breach of duty to protect children in
the government's care, again analyzing applicable defenses

boarding school students. Additionally, the attendees may have claims against the
various churches that ran certain schools. All those claims should be explored.
However, such an exploration is outside the scope of this article.
5. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation
as Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305 (2004) (discussing how international
human rights violations can be vindicated in mass tort suits seeking individual redress
and how human rights claims also fit into the mold of public impact litigation); Kevin R.
Johnson, InternationalHuman Rights Class Actions: New Frontiersfor Group Litigation, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 643 (2004) (discussing various domestic law remedies and how to
bring human rights litigation claims in U.S. courts); TORTURE AS TORT (Craig Scott, ed.,
2001) (compiling essays discussing issues arising in tort claims based upon violation of
international norms against torture).
6. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (class action
brought by citizens of the Philippines who were tortured, executed or "disappeared" by
Philippine military or paramilitary groups); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
(allowing victims of international human rights violations to bring claims against selfproclaimed president of Bosnian-Serb republic); see also Beth Van Shaack, Unfulfilled
Promise: The Human Rights Class Action, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279 (2003) [hereinafter Van
Shaack, Unfulfilled Promise] (discussing Hilao and Kadic as well as various class action
claims for violation of international law norms brought against private corporations,
claims brought by holocaust victims against Swiss banks and German industry and
claims brought by Japanese comfort women and others who were injured by Japanese
corporations that engaged in conduct prohibited under international law).
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including statute of limitations and discretionary function. After
discussing these statutory-based claims, the section discusses
various international law claims, including claims based upon
international prohibitions against genocide, torture and violations of
the fundamental rights of children, addressing both the claims and
some likely defenses to those international law claims. Part IV, the
final section of the article, briefly reviews a Canadian governmental
attempt to aid boarding school litigants and urges the United States
to undertake similar action, or to consider other ways to begin to
redress some of the wrongs inflicted upon boarding school
survivors. The article concludes by arguing that although centuries
of genocidal conduct cannot be redressed by litigation of the
boarding school cases, cases brought by boarding school attendees
can vindicate individual litigants. These cases also can bring the
government's abusive and horrendous treatment of AmericanIndian children into the public consciousness, and, perhaps most
importantly, this kind of litigation can be used as an example of how
the law can and should redress large scale human rights violations.

I. Historical Context
It is impossible to know exactly how many indigenous people
lived on this continent when Columbus arrived. However, most
scholars now agree that the number is somewhere around 15
million, although estimates of indigenous occupants of these lands
have ranged from two million to ninety-four million people. 7 While
the indigenous peoples of this continent comprised hundreds of
nations, each with its own unique history and culture, they had
certain commonalities, including a strong sense of family, which
included a broad kinship network. 8 Generally, their children were
raised in an atmosphere of love and affection and most Indian
7. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE 135 (1995) (finding that
today, scholars tend to use 15 million as the most likely approximate of the real size of
the North American aboriginal population); see also William Bradford, With A Very Great
Blame On Our Hearts: Reparation, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Pleafor Peace with
Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 22 (2002-2003) (noting that estimates of pre-Columbian
people living here range from five million to ninety-four million).
8. Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. LAW REV. 331, 327 (1987) (presented to U. Wisc. Institute of
Legal Studies Legal History Program); see also SUZANNE FOURNIER & ERNIE CREY,
STOLEN FROM OUR EMBRACE, THE ABDUCTION OF FIRST NATIONS CHILDREN AND THE

RESTORATION OF ABORIGINAL COMMUNIIES 52 (1997) (noting that in the 1600s aboriginal
North Americans had strong cultural and spiritual traditions "founded on seemingly
immutable bonds between children and extended families").
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nations found corporal punishment abhorrent. 9 American-Indian
children were taught the value of supporting their communities
rather than the value of acquiring material goods and property for
themselves. They were given names that connected them to the
land and the spirits which guided them. There was no formal
schooling. Rather, children were raised by the community and
educated in the community's ways: its ethics, traditions, religions,
and its life-sustaining skills, such as hunting, cooking, weaving or
farming.10
To Europeans, ownership of land and other property,
Christianity, a nuclear family in which the man made all the
decisions and children were strictly and harshly disciplined and
were taught the value of hard work so that they could acquire more
land and material goods, were life's guiding principles." These
principles shaped the devastation wrought by European settlers on
America's indigenous people.
To European settlers, property ownership was a key value.
One obvious impediment to these settlers' quest for property was
that millions of indigenous people already lived here. Colonists
attacked the problem of acquiring land on multiple fronts. Initially,
when they did not have the armies and resources necessary to fight
the indigenous people, and when it suited them politically because
it gave them international legitimacy, they negotiated treaties with
American Indian nations and recognized American Indian
sovereignty. For example, in 1787, Congress enacted the Northwest
Ordinance which declared that " [t]he utmost good faith shall always
be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent." 12 Based upon that
recognition of American Indian sovereignty, in the first 100 years of
this country's existence, the United States negotiated treaties with
over 400 separate American Indian nations. Congress halted the
9. Lacey, supra note 8, at 347; JON REYHNER & JEANNE EDER, AMERICAN INDIAN
EDUCATION 15 (2004).
10. Lacey, supra note 8, at 346-47, REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 14-15; DAVID
DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
3-21 (1993).
11. See generally Lacey, supra note 8, at 330-48 (discussing European settlers' views on
family, gender roles, property ownership, child-rearing, religion and work ethic);

Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
ChritianizationPolicy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 819-23 (1997) (describing how the process of "Christianizing" the Indians

necessarily included inculcating the values of reverence for individual ownership of
property); LAURENCE ARMAND FRENCH, NATWE AMERICAN JUSTICE, 82-96 (2003)
(discussing the Harmony Ethos of the Cherokee and how it differed from the EuroAmerican Protestant ethic).
12. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52.
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treaty-ratification process in 1871, but even then the United States
government recognized the need for such agreements with
American Indians and entered into approximately 400 more
13
"executive agreements" which accomplished the same purpose.
Treaties with American Indian nations, along with the
Constitution and laws made pursuant to the Constitution, were "the
supreme Law of the Land." 14 In the initial era of this country, the
government treated American Indian nations as independent
sovereign entities and it negotiated treaties in order to acquire more
land. Of course, history has demonstrated that the treaties were
fraudulently and coercively negotiated, changed during the
Congressional ratification process, and routinely ignored by the
15
United States government.
Treaties did not provide the settlers with all the land they
wanted and they began to use other means to acquire new land.
Settlers and the newly formed United States government justified
the white man's move westward by claiming that God wanted
white Christians to control the continent and bring democracy and
civilization to it. It was the "Manifest Destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon
race to expand westward and remove American Indians from the
land that the settlers wanted. 16 This justification served as the basis
13. Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 235, 244 (1982) (noting that over 400 treaties were negotiated prior to an
1871 Act of Congress prohibiting any more treaties with American Indian nations); see
generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN
DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999) (compiling

ratified and non-ratified treaties and other executive agreements).
14. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1156 n.112 (1990) (noting that while
many early treaties were likely bilateral contracts because American Indian nations were
negotiating from positions of strength, later treaties and agreements were often imposed
upon American Indian nations unilaterally and coercively, and the treaty terms often
were unilaterally changed before Senate ratification); see also Siegfried Wiessner,
American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 584
(1995) (noting that initially, the United States government extended Indian nations the
same courtesy and respect with regard to treaties that was accorded to other European
nations).
16. See FRENCH, supra note 11, at 80-82 (discussing how the Protestant ethic
metamorphized into Manifest Destiny). For a discussion of the racist underpinnings of
"Manifest Destiny," see THOMAS R. HIETALA, MANIFEST DESIGN: ANXIOUS
AGGRANDIZEMENT IN LATE JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1985) (discussing Manifest Destiny in

terms of the cultural and political context of that era); REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND
MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM

(1981)

(discussing how ideas in the intellectual communities influenced public and political
ideas of the "superior" Anglo-Saxon race and how this superior racial ideology could be
used to justify treatment of "inferior" races such as American Indians); RICHARD
DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND EMPIRE BUILDING
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for conduct designed to weaken and ultimately eliminate the
American-Indian population. The intentional decimation of the
American Indian came in many different forms: battles over land,
including many in which innocent women and children were
slaughtered, 17 forced internments and death marches such as the
infamous "Trail of Tears," 18 and the spread of famine by deliberately
depriving people of food by killing all of the buffalo. 19 The United
States government also implemented its reservation policy, using
military force to move American Indians onto small land bases that
affected their ability to live off the land and forced them to accept
government rations and annuities in order to survive. 2° The
measures described above led to the deaths of millions of American
Indians and the appropriation of huge portions of the continent's
land mass. At the end of the 19th century, the American-Indian
(1980) (discussing how racism was a key component in the justification of taking land
from America's native peoples).
17. See, e.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 220-22 (1997) (discussing the slaughter of
many innocent American Indians by white militias as well as government troops);
EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED

STATES, 1775 TO PRESENT, 29-30 (1991) (discussing how at the urging of their
commander, Colonel John Chivington, a group of local volunteers sliced open pregnant
American-Indian women's bellies, murdered American-Indian children and mutilated
the women's and children's corpses); DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE,

439-45 (Henry Holt and Co. 1970) (describing the U.S. Calvary's slaughter of innocent
women and children at Wounded Knee).
18. CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 14445 (describing numerous death marches and
deliberate attempts to starve Indian people); Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity:
The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act and The BureaucraticConstruction of Interests, 28 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 1149, 1152-54 (1994) (describing the long brutal settlement march of the
Yavapai in 1875).
19. ROBERT BURNETTE & JOHN KOSTER, THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 83 (1974)

(discussing General Sheridan's command to white hunters to kill buffalo and starve
Indians, and noting that when conservationists protested, Sheridan responded: "Protect
the buffalo, hell! The hide hunters have done more to solve the Indian problem than the
army has done in 30 years."); Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56
MONT. L. REV. 451, 455 n.24 (1995) (noting that "[d]uring congressional discussion of the
Buffalo Protection Bill, congressmen argued that the extermination of the buffalo
promoted the submission of the Indian" (citing 2 Cong. Rec. 2105-08 (1874)).
20. FRANCIS PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND

THE AMERICAN INDIANS 315-18 (Univ. of Neb. 1984) (describing the government's move
to place American Indians on reservations and the whittling of reservation lands);
Bethany R. Berger, "Power Over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in
U.S. v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 2017 n.306-07 (2004) (describing the
government's reservation policy which included confining Indians to small plots of land
and letting them nearly starve so that they would be forced to become farmers or engage
in other forms of labor in order to survive); see also, John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha-Sapa:
Achieving Environmental Justice by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred
Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 48-54 (2001)
(describing a government plan to coerce the "sale" of Indian lands by refusing to supply
even subsistence level food unless the Indians agreed to cede their land).
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population had dwindled from a pre-Columbian estimate of 15
million to somewhere between 237,000 to 330,000.21
By the 1870s, having killed millions of American Indians, and
having stripped the remaining America Indians of their ability to be
self-sustaining, many felt that it was just a matter of time before
American Indians became extinct. 22
Rather than completely
eliminate these peoples, many "Christians," who now had the land
they desired, looked at ways they could "save" the remaining
American Indians. Their view was that salvation for American
Indians lay in assimilation.23 The goal of assimilation was to
eliminate American-Indian culture in order to rid the country of
people who had values of shared land and communal living and
replace them with people who believed in individual land
ownership and capitalism. 24 The plan was to eliminate the few
remaining American Indians "as such" via assimilation.
One key aspect of assimilation was the destruction of
communal values and communal property. 25 Thus, the government
decided that American Indians should individually, rather than
collectively, own reservation property.2 6 In 1887, Congress passed
the Dawes Act, in which the government took land that had been
negotiated as "Indian lands" in various treaties and began allocating
that land in 80 acre parcels to eligible American Indians. 27 The Act,
although theoretically designed to encourage individual ownership
and help American Indians see the value of full participation in a
21. Bradford, supra note 7, at 22; CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 129 (noting that a 1900
Census Bureau report indicates barely over 237,000 native people living within the
country's claimed boundaries and a Smithsonian Institution report indicates less than
333,000 Indians living in all of North America, including Greenland, in 1900).
22. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that some people, including many
policymakers, believed Indians had only two choices: civilization or extinction).
23. Id.; see also AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS

OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900, 1 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) (quoting the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs in 1889 as saying "[t]his civilization may not be the best possible ... but
it is the best the Indians can get. They cannot escape it, and must either conform to it or
be crushed by it").
24. See generally Lacey, supra note 8, at 349-56 (discussing the assimilationist policy);
ADAMS, supra note 3, at 15-16 (discussing the view that assimilation would save the
Indians from extinction).
25. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 16-17 (describing reformers' view that "civilization" in
the form of owning and working individual plots of land was a key to assimilation).
26. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, This Land is My Land, This Land is Your Land: Markets and
Institutionsfor Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 245, 260-62
(2005) (describing assimilationists belief that allotment would weaken tribal affiliations
and build allegiance to federal government and would make Indians into "industrious"
farmers thus putting the land to "good use").
27. Dawes Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
331 (1994).
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capitalist society, was also premised on a desire to shrink the
reservations and open the excess land to white settlers. 28 This Act
and its counterparts resulted in American Indians' loss of about
two-thirds of their lands. 29 The Allotment Act was only one part of
the assimilationist movement. It worked in conjunction with other
assimilationist laws.
Everything "Indian" came under attack. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs banned all Indian feasts, languages, certain marriage
practices, dances, and any practices by medicine or religious
30
persons.
Thus, the government was stripping American-Indian peoples
of their land, their religion and their ability to sustain themselves.
This was not enough. The next step was to take the children.

II. Boarding School History and Atrocities
"The war against Indians had now entered a new phase.
Conquering a continent and its aboriginal peoples had been a
bloody business, and for a Christian people, not without moral
discomfort. Now the war against savagism would be waged in a
and
gentler fashion. The next Indian war would be ideological
31
psychological and it would be waged against children."
A major plank in the assimilationist platform was the
indoctrination of American-Indian children in the white man's
ways, mainly through government-managed "education" programs.
For
In fact, over 100 treaties contained education provisions. 32
28. See JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 18871934 1-3 (1991) (noting that although some policy makers may have been trying to
protect American Indians from land grabbers before the Act passed, after it passed there
was great pressure to satisfy white people's hunger for land).

29. CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 246 (citing KIRK KICKING BIRD & KAREN
DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (New York; MacMillan, 1973)); see also

FRENCH, supra note 11, at 25 (noting that between 1887 and 1934, Indian-held land fell
from 138 million acres to 48 million acres, with much of the land retained by American
Indians located in the desert or other places unsuitable for farming. French notes that
even among those granted allotments many lost their lands for failure to pay property
taxes).
30. U.S. Commission on Human Rights, A HistoricalContext for Evaluation,in NATIVE
AMERICANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (Fremont J. Lyden & Lyman H. Legters eds., 1992);

see also Dussias, supra note 11, at 788-94 (describing the prohibitions on American Indian
spiritual practices, especially the ban on spiritual dances).
31. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 27.

32. MANN, supra note 3, at 170 (noting that 120 treaties contained education
provisions); DEJONG, supra note 10, at 34 (noting that 110 treaties had education
provisions).
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example, in the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, the United States
government promised to build reservation schools and provide one
teacher for every 30 school-age children on agricultural
reservations.3 3 Originally, the government delegated the education
of American Indians to religious groups and missionaries.3 4 By the
mid-1800s, missionary schools were supplemented by government
day schools, located on American-Indian reservations.3 5 However,
by the late 1800s, many felt that as long as American-Indian children
spent significant time with their families and thus learned the
culture and the values of their people the children would not be
successfully assimilated. 36 Thus, rather than fulfill their treaty
obligations and build reservation schools, the government looked
for another means to assimilate American-Indian children. The
conditions were politically ripe for the forced removal of American
Indian children from their homes in the name of "civilizing" them.
It was into this atmosphere that Captain Richard Henry Pratt
marched. Pratt experimented with assimilationist techniques for
compelling ideological conversion while supervising a prison camp
of American-Indian captives from 1875-1878. 37 Based upon his
experience with prisoners, he convinced the government to allow
him to use an old military barracks in Pennsylvania to establish the
Carlisle Indian Industrial school, the first of many American Indian
boarding schools. 38 In the 1878 Annual Report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, it was argued that the only way to "educate" and

33. MANN, supra note 3, at 10-11.
34. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 14-58; Dussias, supra note 11, at 784-87 (1997)
(discussing the government's subsidy of American Indian schools run by various
Christian groups during the 1800s); ADAMS, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that in 1819
Congress authorized a Civilization Fund, with an eye toward indoctrinating Indian
children into the white man's ways - an indoctrination initially delegated to missionary
societies); see generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN
ANALYSIS OF PROTESTANT MISSIONS AND AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE 1878-1962 (1965)
(describing the role of missionaries in the "civilization" and "assimilation" process); see
also United Methodist Church, Confession to Native Americans, 1992, available at
http://www2.wcc-coe.org/ccdocuments.nsf/index/plen-4.5-en.html,
reprinted
in
ROBERT O. PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM 398-99 (2005) (apologizing to American
Indians for the church's complicity in the destruction of Native American people,
culture and religious practices).
35. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 28-29.

36. Id. at 29.
37. Id. at 46-48 (summarizing Pratt's experience with the "conversion" of Indian

prisoners into "productive" citizens).

For his own account of this assimilationist

program, see Pratt's autobiography: RICHARD HENRY PRATIT, BATTLEFIELD AND THE
CLASSROOM: FOUR DECADES WITH THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1867-1904, 104-90 (Robert M.
Utley, ed., Yale Press 1964).
38. MARGARET C. SzAsz, EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 9-10 (1974);

ADAMS, supra note 3, at 48.
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"civilize" American-Indian children was to have them "removed
from the examples of their parents." 39 In that same report, Pratt
noted, that the schoolchildren could be held as "hostages for good
40
behavior of [their] parents."
As for what he would do with the children once they were in
his care, Pratt's goal was clear:
A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one,
and that the high sanction of his destruction has been an
enormous factor in promoting Indian massacres. In a sense, I
agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there
is in the
race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the
41
man.

Described below are the horrendous means employed to
achieve the assimilationist goal of "killing the Indian and saving the
man." 42
A. Forced Attendance
If the assimilationist plan was to work, young children had to
Some American-Indian parents,
attend the boarding schools.
conditions imposed by the
poverty
and
living
by
the
devastated
government, reluctantly agreed to send their children to the

39. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 71 (citing the 1878 Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
40. Id.
41. Col. Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling with Whites, OFFICIAL REP. OF
THE 19TH ANN. CONT. OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 46-59 (1882), reprinted in PORTER,
supra note 34, at 382-83.
42. Unlike Canada, the United States government has not undertaken a systematic
study of the conditions existing at American Indian boarding schools and the impact of
the schools upon our native peoples. Thus, parts II.A-G, infra attempt to pull together
information from various sources, many of them historical. The Boarding School
Healing Project, a coalition of American Indian groups, currently is involved in the
arduous task of systematically documenting boarding school abuses and their impact
upon American Indian boarding school attendees and the American-Indian peoples.
Thus, the information set out in subparts II.A-G, below is just the beginning of the story.
Additional information gathered from living survivors of the boarding schools, later will
be available from the Boarding School Healing Project. For more information about the
Boarding School Healing Project, see Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native
MAGAZINE,
http://www.anmestyusa.org/
AMNESTY
American
Schools,
amnestynow/soulwound.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). Although the Boarding
School Healing Project is gathering information from school attendees, it is likely that
the full extent of the government's knowledge and wrongdoing will not be known until
suits have been filed and discovery completed.
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government boarding institutions so that the children could learn
how to deal with the white man and help their families. 43 Other
parents resisted the government's command that their children
attend government boarding institutions.
In 1891, Congress
authorized the U.S. Commissioner of Indian affairs to "make and
enforce... such rules and regulations as will secure the attendance
of Indian children of suitable age and health at schools established
and maintained for their benefit." 44 In 1893, Congress codified
something that was already being done - it allowed the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to "withhold rations, clothing and other annuities
from Indian parents or guardians who refuse or neglect to send and
keep their children of proper school age in some school a reasonable
portion of each year." 45 Although this policy ostensibly changed a
few years later, in practice, it continued. 46 For example, in 1914, one
American-Indian woman reported that she was told her lease
money would be withheld if she did not place her 7 year-old
daughter in school. 47 So, many American-Indian parents were
caught between a rock and a hard place: send your school-age
children away to government schools, or face watching your
toddlers and babies starve because the government withheld your
rations. Many parents, under this kind of coercion, had no choice
but to allow their children to attend the government schools. Others
resisted and were subdued by police and soldiers while their
children were often forcibly taken from them.48 One witness
testifying before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on
Indian Affairs in 1932, described how parents who tried to hide their
children were thwarted by government workers who literally ran
down the children, roped them like cattle, and took them away from
their parents, many times never to return.49
In some cases, parents who resisted the capture of their children
43. BRENDA CHILD, BOARDING SCHOOL SEASONS 11-25

(1998) (describing the

desperate economic circumstances that forced many Ojibwe parents to send their
children to off-reservation schools).

44. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1014.
45. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 635.
46. See, e.g., REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 176-77 (describing the "kid catching"
and round-ups of Navajo children); see also CHILD, supra note 43, at 13 (noting that in
1907 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs "still endorsed the use of force in bringing
children to school when families would not cooperate with voluntary measures").
47. MANN, supra note 3, at 138.
48. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 216 (describing a federal agent's description of his use of
force to take American-Indian children from their parents); CHILD, supra note 43, at 13
(describing how many parents refused to surrender their children to government
agents); CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN 17 (2004) (relaying numerous stories of parental
resistance to the forced removal of their children).
49. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 177-78.
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not only lost their children, but they also went to prison for refusal
to send their children away. For example, a group of Hopis who
refused to send their children to government school were
imprisoned on Alcatraz Island. 50
By 1895, there were 157 boarding schools with 15,061 students,
as compared to 125 day schools with 3,127 students. 51 The number
of schools and students enrolled waxed and waned throughout the
20th century5 2 but the government's failure to comply with treaty
provisions promising on-reservation schools 53 meant that from the
late 1800s to the 1930s, almost half of all American-Indian children
enrolled in school were forced to leave home in order to go to
54
government-run boarding schools.
In the latter part of the 20th century, the forced attendance of
children was coerced by slightly more subtle means than chasing the
children down and roping them like cattle. The government had
placed American Indians onto reservations and into conditions of
55
extreme poverty often with virtually no means of livelihood.
Parents who wanted a chance for their children to escape the
poverty sent their children to the schools in the hope that learning
the "white man's ways" could lift the children, and the community,
out of destitution.5 6 Even if parents did not want to send their
children to school, state and federal laws forced them to do so. 57 In
fact, in at least one case, failure to comply with compulsory
attendance laws resulted in a termination of parental rights
58
proceeding.
50. CHILD, supra note 43, at 13.
51. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 58.

52. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 151, Table 2 (showing that between 1880-1930,
the number of boarding schools ranged from a low of 60 to a high of 156). SZASZ, supra
note 38, at 60 (noting that in 1941, there were still 49 boarding schools with a total
enrollment of about 14,000 children).
53. See THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION 124 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine

Deloria, Jr. eds., Temple Univ. Press 1984) (noting that the 1867-68 Peace Commission
treaties "promised a schoolhouse and teacher for every group of thirty Indian children
who could be induced to attend school").
54. See, e.g., REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 151, Table 2.
55. RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO'S REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN

CULTURE AND POLICY 53 (1997) (describing the conditions of poverty on Indian
reservations).

56. See, e.g., CHILD, supra note 43, at 47 (setting out a letter from a mother who sent
her son to a government run boarding school in the hope that he would learn a trade
and be able to support her).
57. 25 C.F.R. § 11.424 (2006) (stating that it is a punishable offense for a parent or
guardian of an American-Indian child to fail to send the child to school).

58. See, e.g., State ex rel Adams v. Superior Court for Okanogan County, 356 P.2d 985
(Wash. 1960) (finding that order terminating parental rights because American-Indian
parents did not send their four children to school was improper because in this case, the
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Given compulsory education laws, combined with the dire
economic circumstances on the reservations, when no schools were
provided near the children's homes, they had no choice but to
attend boarding schools. Thus the compelled boarding school
attendance of many American-Indian children amongst some
American-Indian nations continued through the late 1960s. For
example, amongst Navajo students in schools, a 1968 BIA Annual
School Census Report indicated that as late as 1967, 83% of Navajos
age 9 and younger attended either on -or off - reservation
government boarding schools. 59 In 1987 "... ten percent of all
Indian children were enrolled in BIA schools. Of this number,
38,000 were members of tribes whose lands were located within the
states of Arizona, New Mexico and the Dakotas." 60 Thus, the
government run schools continued to operate through the latter part
of the 20th century.
B. Destruction of Culture
The United States government, through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, formerly a part of the War Department and later a part of
the Department of Interior, 61 operated and controlled the American
Indian boarding schools. The government, in its role as guardian of
the children, was thus able to implement its plan to eliminate the
62
American Indians as distinct peoples.
In an effort to wipe out American Indian culture, the boarding
parents belonged to an American-Indian nation that had not consented to state, rather
than federal, jurisdiction over compulsory school attendance).
59. See SUBcOMM. COMM. LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, THE EDUCATION OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, S. Rep. No. 501, at 54 (1959) [hereinafter 1969 SENATE REPORT]. It

was not only Navaho children in the schools. The 1969 SENATE REPORT noted that
"[m]ore that 12,000 Indian children attend school in 19 off-reservation boarding schools
today. These young people are frequently transported hundreds of miles to their new
homes, which are far away from the influence exerted by the security of family life,
tribal value, standards and customs. in high school, usually more than 25 percent of
them drop out before graduation. A vast majority of them are labeled by their teachers
as misfits, underachievers, or troublemakers, and attitudes of school personnel insure
that they will never be considered otherwise while in school." Id. at 253.
60. SZASZ, supra note 38, at 214. By the end of the Reagan administration, only a few
federal boarding schools remained. Id. at 216.
61. Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to
American Indians,19 BYU J.PUB. L. 1, 4-7 (2004) (briefly reviewing the genesis of the BIA).
62. This "educational" objective was stated by boarding school founder Captain
Richard Henry Pratt in 1895 and echoed by U.S. Indian Commissioner William A. Jones
in 1903. See CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 13-14. Even through the 1960s, AmericanIndian children found themselves "removed from their culture and placed in the midst
of another, which is presented as superior." 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 33.
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schools denigrated all things connected to American-Indian culture
and they attempted to strip young children of their cultural
identity. 63 After often traveling for days, American-Indian children
as young as five years old arrived at their new homes and
immediately were told they were "dirty Indians" and were doused
with alcohol and kerosene to "disinfect" them. 64 American-Indian
boys, who proudly grew their hair in the tradition of their
forefathers, quickly had their heads shaven - an incredibly
humiliating and traumatic experience. 65 All the children were
stripped of their American-Indian clothing and belongings - all
things that connected them to their homes and families - and were
given uniforms. 66 The purpose of uniforms, which often were made
of inferior and uncomfortable materials, was to quickly strip
children of their sense of individuality
and teach them the values of
"sameness, regularity and order." 67
American-Indian names held special cultural significance.
American-Indian children's names were chosen with great care and
ceremony, often reflecting developmental achievements or given to
pass along traits of honored relatives or leaders. 68 When the
children arrived at the boarding schools, not only were all physical
reminders of their families taken from them, they also lost one of
their strongest connections to their people - their names. School
administrators gave American-Indian children English names - first
and last names, like white people.69 As one scholar notes, re-naming
students was part of a conscious government policy so that when
American Indians finally adopted the white man's ways and began
to value individual ownership of property, lines of inheritance
would be easier to administer. 70 It was also part of the plan to strip

63. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 100-21 (describing the assault on cultural identity);
CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 19-29 (describing attempts to rid the children of their

cultural identity).
64. CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 19.

65. REHYNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 178 (reporting how one group of boys felt such
great shame after having their hair cut that they were unable to eat). As David Adams
points out, although the ostensible reason for shearing the boys' heads was cleanliness,
the fallacy of that reasoning was evident when the girls' hair was left long. He opines
that the shaving of boys' heads was just one of the many assaults on these young
children's cultural identity because long hair was "symbolic of savagism; removing it
was central to the new identification with civilization." ADAMS, supra note 3,at 101.
66. CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 19.
67. Id.; see also ADAMS, supra note 3, at 107 (noting that one official found that "[a]

school uniform is a great cross to Indian pupils. One Indian never likes to appear like
any other.").
68. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 111.
69. Id. at 109-10 (describing the renaming process).
70. Id. at 108.
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the children of their identity. 71
The psychological assault on identity went even further than
changing the way the children looked and their names. It was
embedded in every aspect of the boarding school life. Children
were forbidden to speak their native languages, and those caught
72
speaking in their own languages were often severely punished.
For example, for students who spoke their native languages,
"having one's mouth washed with soap or lye, or being locked in
the school jail were not uncommon punishments." 73 The prohibition
against using native languages lasted at least through the 1960s,
when one teacher reported in 1967 that "it was constantly drilled
into us that the students were not allowed to speak Navajo." 74
Given that most American Indians conveyed their history and
knowledge through complex oral traditions, 75 forcing the children to
lose their language meant that they would have a difficult time
communicating with their parents and grandparents and was yet
another way to cut them off from their heritage. 76 Loss of their
native languages thus further removed children from their families,
their history and their culture. Additionally, losing their languages
most likely caused many children a loss of self-identity 77 because
one's language is inextricably tied to one's self-definition. 78
Indian identity also came under assault in another forum - the
curriculum of the school. Virtually all the books used in the schools
from their inception through the 1960s reflected only white middle

71. CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 19-21 (discussing how renaming caused students to
feel as if they had lost touch with who they were).
72. CHILD, supra note 43, at 28 (describing the harsh punishments inflicted upon the
children when they spoke their native languages).

73. Id.
74. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 246.
75. Angela R. Hoeft, Coming Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from an
International Human Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. 203, 249 (1995) (noting the

importance of the oral tradition in American Indian history and culture).
76. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing how loss of language can lead to
loss of cultural knowledge).
77. Madeleine Plasencia, Suppressing the Mother Tongue: Anti-Subordination and the
Legal Struggle over Control of Communication, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 989 (1999) (arguing that
one's language contributes to one's sense of identity and self-esteem).
78. In discussing the dismissal of Latino jurors because of their ability to speak and
understand Spanish, the Supreme Court acknowledged that choice of language is tied to
self-definition. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1991) ("It would be
common knowledge in the locality that a significant percentage of the Latino population

speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred language, the one
chosen for personal communication, the one selected for speaking with the most
precision and power, the one used to define the self.") (emphasis added).
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class culture.79 This had the predictable effect, at least for some
children, of making them ashamed of who they were. As one child
noted:
My life was no longer just right. I was ashamed of being who I
was and I wanted to change right then and there. Somehow it
became so important to have straight walls, clean hair and teeth,
and a spotted dog to chase after. I even became critical and
hateful toward my bony, fleabag of a dog. I loved the familiar
and cozy surroundings of my grandmother's house but now I
imagined it could be a heck of a lot better if only I had a white
man's house with a bed, a nice couch, and a clock. In school
books, all the child characters ever did was run around chasing
their dog or a kite. They were always happy. As for me, all I
seemed to do at home was go back and forth with buckets of
fire... Did my grandmother
water and cut up sticks for a lousy
really care about my well-being?80
Teaching the children to despise their upbringing and families
by exposing them to a curriculum in which white Christian values
were presented as the norm was yet another way to destroy the
children's sense of identity and their connection to their people.
Additionally, to make the children more like "white men," the
children were forced to abandon their own sense of spirituality.
Conversion to Christianity, and thus to a more "white" perspective
was seen as a key piece of the children's "education."8 1 This, too,
was a way to destroy the children's connection to their people and
their culture. As a member of the Lakota Sioux Nation noted:
"spirituality is the basis of our culture; if it is stolen, our culture will
be dissolved. If our culture is dissolved, Indian people, as such will
"82
cease to exist.
Finally, in many instances, it was believed that the goal of
"civilizing" the children could only be achieved by completely
severing the children's ties to their parents and their families. For
example, in one reported case, an 8-year-old child had been residing
in a government boarding school for three years. When the school
refused to allow him to return home, his mother filed a writ of

79. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 247.

80. Id. at 247.
81. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 164-73 (discussing American Indian spiritual values and
the schools' goal of converting the children to Christianity); see also, Dussias, supra note

11, at 786-87.
82. WARD

CHURCHILL,

COLONIALISM,

GENOCIDE

AND

THE EXPROPRIATION

OF

INDIGENOUS SPIRITUAL TRADITION IN CONTEMPORARY ACADEMIA 41 (1991-92) (quoting
Russell Means, Lakota Sioux Nation).
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habeas corpus seeking his return. 83 Rather than reunite mother and
child, the court held that when the mother allowed the school
superintendent to take custody of her 5-year-old, the mother
relinquished the right to raise him. The court reasoned that it was in
the child's best interest to remain in school and become "civilized." 84
This reported case reflects the prevalent attitude that children did
best if separated completely from their parents.85 Thus, in many
cases, parents were prohibited from visiting or even communicating
with their children and children were not allowed to return home
for years at a time.8 6 Some schools even refused to send children
home when their parents were dying.8 7 Attempts to return home
were harshly punished. In fact, children who attempted to run
away from the schools were called "AWOLs" and staff, local police,
and "trackers" hunted them down and dragged them back to
school. 88 The runaway children were severely punished with even
runaway children as young as kindergarten age being confined in
the school jail upon their capture.8 9 The practice of calling runaways
"AWOLs" and tracking them down and returning them to school
lasted into the 1960s.90
C. Living Conditions
With upwards of 150 federal boarding schools and many other
church-run schools, living conditions varied. However, many of the
schools provided horrendously inadequate shelter and living
conditions.
A 1928 government study, the Meriam Report, 91
described many of the inadequacies: buildings with poor
83. In re Petition of Can-ah-couqua, 29 F. 687 (D.D. Alaska 1887), reprinted in
PORTER, supra note 34, at 389-92.
84. Id.
85. CHILD, supranote 43, at 43.
86. Id. at 43-54 (discussing how children and parents were prevented from
communicating with and visiting with each other).

87. Id. at 50.
88. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 225-26.
89. Id. at 224 (noting that in 1927, the desertion rate at Chilocco was 111 boys and 18
girls). See generally CHILD, supra note 43 at 87-95 (containing letters home written by
runaway children).

90. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 63-64. (Noting schools prohibited
parent/child contact or limited it to prevent AWOLs and that schools needed AWOL

retrievers).
91. INSTITrrUTE

FOR

GOVERNMENT

RESEARCH,

THE

PROBLEM

OF

INDIAN

ADMINISTRATION (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1971) [hereinafter MERIAM REPORT]. This
report is commonly known as the Meriam Report after its principal investigator, Lewis
Meriam.
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ventilation; inadequate light and air; fire hazards in buildings,
including locked fire escapes and nailed windows; dorms without
night toilets; unsanitary bathrooms; lack of toilet paper; no soap;
trough-type facilities for washing hands and face, despite the
prevalence of highly contagious diseases; one can of toothpowder
for all the children, with many brushes coming in contact with the
can's contents; and poor kitchen equipment, which made it hard to
prepare food properly. 92 A 1969 Senate Report shows conditions
had not improved much. As that report noted, at one school the
dorm room walls had holes in them, and one room contained heavy
duty electrical wiring at the head of one child's bed, clearly
93
exposing the sleeping child to the risk of electrocution.
In addition to dismal housing conditions, the Meriam Report
found that many students were faced with near-starvation rations.
For example, at the Rice School, the average amount spent for food
was just nine cents a day per child. The children did not get an
adequate amount of food, even of the very limited variety
supplied. 94 Supplies were generally purchased on the lowest bid,
and often a very poor grade of food was purchased. 95 School
employees got the best cuts of meat while the children got only the
necks and ribs. 96 Many boarding schools, including Haskell and
Flandreau, operated dairies, but the children drank coffee instead of
milk.97 The effects of these policies of near starvation and poor
quality food were predictable.
For example, most students
attending the South Dakota Flandreau Indian School had come from
Lakota
communities
where
malnutrition
was
rampant.
Nonetheless, a May 1925 survey showed that more than 80
Flandreau students weighed less in May 1925 than when they had
entered the school in September 1924.98
The poor physical
conditions created by the near starvation diets and unsanitary and
crowded living conditions also left the children very vulnerable to
disease, and, in many cases, led to the children's deaths. 99

92. Id. at 314-26.
93. 1969 SENATE

REPORT,

supra note 59, at 312.

94. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 327.

95. Id. at 328.
96. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 115.
97. CHILD, supra note 43, at 32.
98. Id.
99. See generally CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 29-51 (describing the conditions at U.S.
and Canadian schools and discussing how the physical conditions at the schools led to
the children's disease and death); CHILD, supra note 43, at 55-68 (discussing illness and
death at the schools); see also ADAMS, supra note 3, at 124-35 (discussing same).
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Forced Labor

The workload imposed upon the children compounded the
effect of malnutrition and poor living conditions. In what was
rationalized as an effort to teach them the value of hard work and
industry, young children spent at least half of the day doing labor.
As the Meriam Report noted, "[t]he idea of adjusting the child's
duty to his physical ability is practically unknown in the Indian
School."1 00 Small children were forced to do great piles of laundry
using dangerous machines in an overcrowded room filled with
steam. Boys, including very small boys, were working in the
schools' dairies without proper equipment. 10 1 Although the work
they were assigned was supposed to be educational and help them
with later employment, the reality is that they often worked to
support or make money for the school. For example, the Meriam
Report notes that at Haskell a boy detailed to the print shop to be
taught printing might "be required to fold papers for all the hours of
his detail and to work under pressure to get a commercial job out on
time." 10 2 Folding papers for hours a day every day, just like ironing
simple dresses and shirts for hours on end, is, as the government's
own report recognized, "production work" and certainly was not
necessary as an educational tool. 1° 3 In fact, the Meriam Report
noted, "The question may very properly be raised as to whether
much of the work of Indian children in boarding schools would not
be prohibited in most states under child labor laws ....." 104 In 1935, a
BIA employee stated that the Indian boarding school system
little children [are]
consisted of "penal institutions -where
sentenced to hard labor for a term of years for the crime of being
born of their mothers." 105 The use of child labor to help support and
106
maintain the schools lasted in many schools through the 1960s.
Summer did not provide a break. During the summer, many
schools sent American-Indian children to live with and work for
100. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 331.

101. Id. at 323-24.
102. Id. at 332.
103. Id. The lack of meaningful vocational education continued through the 1960s
where, in many schools, the jobs the children were trained for either made no sense in
terms of future job prospects or only prepared them to be menial laborers or domestic
servants. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 296, 419.
104. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 13.
105. CHURCHILL, supra note 48 at 44 (citing Oliver LaFarge, "Revolution with
Reservations," New Republic, Oct. 9, 1935 p. 233); see also SZASZ, supra note 38, at 64
(noting that in the 1930s, most Indian boarding schools were supported mainly by
student labor).
106. Kelley, supra note 1, at 5.
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area white families. The idea was to keep the children from the
"savage" lifestyle of their families, immerse them in white culture,
and help them gain marketable skills. 10 7 In turn, it was argued that
white families would learn not to be so prejudiced and would get
labor for a very minimal cost. 10 8 In a few cases, the children were
placed with loving and kind families. 10 9 In most cases, however,
especially in the western states, the program exploited children.110
For example, at Genoa, Chilocco, Albuquerque, and Sherman, the
children were sent out in groups of 50 to 100 to work from sunup to
Girls from
sundown, under the burning sun, harvesting crops.'
the Haskell Institute who participated in the outing program during
the 1930s often were expected to do all the cleaning, cooking,
serving, and childcare for a wage of $3 to $5 a week." 2 As the
Meriam Report noted, the outing program became "mainly a plan
service,
for hiring out boys for odd jobs and girls for domestic
113
seldom a plan for providing real vocational training."
E.

Death and Disease

The hard labor, lack of food and medical care, and overcrowded
unsanitary living conditions predictably resulted in disease and
death. In the United States, because boarding schools sent many
children home to die or to be buried 1 4 we cannot know exactly how
many children died as a result of attending these boarding
schools.115 However, the available statistics show high rates of
107. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 157 (noting how sending the children out to work would
allow white people to learn about Indians); REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 139 (noting
how the outing program provided white people with cheap labor).
108. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 157.
109. Id. at 159-61 (discussing positive "outing" experiences).
110. REHYNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 139 (noting that while Pratt's idea was to place
American-Indian children in white homes where they would be treated like a son or
daughter, in reality, sending American Indian children to white homes, especially in the
West, quickly became a way for white families to obtain cheap servants).
111. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 163.

112. CHILD, supra note 43, at 81-86 (describing working conditions of girls who were
"outed" to middle class families in Kansas and noting that many girls left the families
they were assigned to because they could not handle the demands placed upon them by
housewives who expected the girls to take over all the chores and childcare).
113. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 389.
114. CHILD, supra note 43, at 67; ADAMS, supra note 3, at 130. Professor Charles

Haines, a biology professor at what is now Haskell Indian Nations University, reports
that in addition to the many children buried in the school's graveyard "government
documents show at least 500 more students died and were buried elsewhere." Kelley,
supra note 1, at 4.
115. Although we don't know how many children died as a result of their boarding
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death1u 6 and "by the turn of the century, tribes across the United
7
States associated boarding schools with death.""
Tuberculosis was rampant in all boarding schools 1 8 and TB and
influenza claimed many children's lives.119 Massive numbers of
students also contracted trachoma, a painful eye disease that can
lead to blindness. A 1912 study indicated that "in 37 schools, the
rate [of trachoma] was over 50%; in all thirty of the schools located
in Oklahoma, it had climbed to just under 70%."120 Thus the rate of
serious, contagious and deadly diseases was extremely high.
Despite the high incidence of these contagious diseases, the
schools refused to provide basic sanitary conditions known to
prevent the spread of disease. For example, school officials refused
to separate sick children from healthy ones, thereby causing
tuberculosis to spread very quickly amongst the healthy children.' 21
Schools also ignored the most basic sanitary precautions. For
example, in 1929, the Meriam Report noted that at many schools, the
facilities for washing faces and hands were of the trough type despite the prevalence of trachoma and impetigo. 122 These same
conditions existed at least through the 1960s as evidenced by a
United States Senate report which found that at some schools, sick
children continued to be sent to live with the healthy children, thus
school experience due to harsh living conditions, it has been argued that the boarding
school experience has also contributed to the high rate of suicide deaths amongst
American-Indian young people. See Spero M. Manson, et al, Risk Factorsfor Suicide
Among Indian Adolescents at a BoardingSchool, Pub. Health Rep. 1989, Nov-Dec 104(6) 609614 (noting that American-Indian youth have a much higher-than-average suicide rate);
Jody Vilschick, Suicide Epidemic Continues Among American Indian Youth, U.S. DHHS,
Office of Minority Health Resource Center, Jan-Feb 2002, available at
http://www.omhrc.gov/assets/pdf/checked/Suicide /20Epidemic%20Continues%20A
mong%20American%201ndian%20Youth.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) (discussing
connection between the boarding schools' destruction of Indian identity and culture and
the high American-Indian youth suicide rates). See also infra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text (describing how the schools fostered a sense of self-hatred and loss
of identity which contributed to a young American-Indian man's suicide).
116. For example, 47 of 73 Shoshone and Arpahoe children sent to Carlisle, Genoa or
Santee boarding schools between 1881 and 1894 died. CHILD, supra note 43, at 57.
117. Id. at 62.
118. CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 48, at 35; CHILD, supra note 43, at 62.
119. CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 48, at 35. In general, the death rate of
Indians from TB "was estimated to be six and one-half times that of non-Indians" during
the early part of the twentieth century. SZASZ, supra note 38, at 20 (emphasis added).
120. CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, supra note 48, at 35-36 (citing U.S. Public Health

Service, Contagious and Infectious Diseases Among the Indians (Washington D.C.: 63rd
Cong./lst Sess/[Senate Doc. 1038] 1913; DIANE PUTNEY, FIGHTING THE SCOURGE:
AMERICAN INDIAN MORBIDITY AND FEDERAL POLICY, 1827-1928 141-43 (1980)).

121. CHILD, supra note 43, at 62-63. In one school a superintendent allowed one of the
teachers with a very pronounced case of smallpox to meet with his classes. Id. at 55.
122. MERIAM REPORT, supranote 91, at 318.
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making conditions ripe for contagious illnesses to spread. 123
F.

Physical Abuse and Sexual Predation

Pedophiles and sadistic adults populated the schools' staffs. In
numerous schools, children were beaten with everything from fists
to rubber hoses and even baseball bats.1 24 In 1914, ten girls were
stripped to the waist and flogged with a buggy whip.125 Children
who attempted to run away had a ball and chain tied to their
ankle. 126 One girl who attended Wahpeton School in South Dakota
from 1952-1959, beaten for climbing trees or not making her bed
quickly enough, reports watching an enraged matron beat her good
friend with "coat hangars and everything." 127 Additional incidents
of severe physical and sexual abuse are included in Zephier et al v.
United States, a 2003 lawsuit filed by boarding school attendees. 128
The Zephier plaintiffs alleged being tortured in the middle of the
night; being whipped with boards and sometimes with straps and
being locked in closets for days.129 One plaintiff alleged that she
30
witnessed her cousin being beaten to death in front of her.
Allegations also included sexual abuse and molestation claims,
including instances in which children were forced to watch other
131
children being molested.
Negiel Bigpond Sr., testified before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs in May, 2005 about his experience at the Chilocco
Boarding School. He related the following:
When I first arrived [at Chilocco] I was excited and happy to see

123. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 311.
124. SALLY J. MCBETH, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE OF
WEST-CENTRAL OKLAHOMA INDIANS 106 (1983); ROBERT A. TRENNERT, THE PHOENIX
INDIAN SCHOOL: FORCED ASSIMILATION IN ARIZONA, 1891-1935, 171, 193 (1988).

125. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 123 (quoting the Indian Rights Association Report for

1912 at p. 57).

For a more detailed description of numerous instances of extreme

physical abuse at both U.S. and Canadian boarding schools, see CHURCHILL, supra note

48, at 52-60.
126. MCBETH, supra note 124, at 106.

127. Kelley, supra note 1, at 1.
128. Complaint, Zephier et al v. United States, No. 03-768L (Fed. Cl. April 9, 2003).
This case was brought by numerous boarding school attendees against the government.

It contained both a Tucker Act "bad men" clause treaty violation claim and a breach of
trust claim. The breach of trust claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The
Tucker Act claim was dismissed because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The plaintiffs currently are going through the administrative process.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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so many young Natives in one place, with different languages and
traditions, yet how we talked and laughed and built good
relationships. Then we were forbidden to speak in our languages,
had all our hair cut off into the "G.I." haircut, and the school took
on a military and prison atmosphere. I was made to stay in an old
dorm hut with broken windows. I knew very cold winters and
very hot summers there. We got poorer and began to fight and
steal from one another - the government gave clothes to some
tribes and not to others, so jealousy and envy entered in, and we
turned against one another. Some fought and others withdrew
into isolation. We would try and stop the anger and bad feelings
by drinking, or by sniffing glue, paint or lighter fluid. If caught
drinking or speaking our tribal languages or practicing our
cultural traditions our privileges and even food were taken away.
At times we were put on bread and water.
Sometimes we were given a bit of cheese with the bread and
water. We were put into solitary confinement and punished. I
can remember one night I had to defend myself from one of the
counselors who was trying to provoke me and start trouble so he
could give me hours of work duty or to make me stand all night
in a corner or on top of a one-foot-by-one-foot box with my nose
to the wall. If we were caught sleeping, guards would walk up
behind us and bang our heads into the wall. I received many
bloody noses and cuts on my forehead. We were also made to
scrub floors and walls with small hand brushes and even
toothbrushes.
The emotional and mental abuse was very bad. We were made to
feel that we were nothing. We were called "dogs" and "stupid"
and "Indian" in an angry, degrading and mocking voice. There
was sexual abuse as well that I would rather not talk about. I
choose not to go into the details of all that happened there. When
released and I returned home I would cry a lot. I developed
resentments toward my parents and turned against authority.
I
132
could not trust authority. I could not adapt to public school."

G. Government Knowledge and Complicity
Throughout the history of American Indian boarding schools,
the government had notice of the abysmal and deadly conditions
described above. In 1889, Gen. Henry Heth reported to the Board of
Indian Commissioners that one school was being run by a
discharged lunatic and yet this man still headed the school one year

132. Apology to Native Peoples: Hearing on S.J. Res. 15, Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
112th Cong. (May 19, 2005) (statement of Negiel Bigpond, Sr., President, Two Rivers
Native American Training Center).

Fall 20061

CIVIL CLAIMS FOR UNCIVILIZED ACTS

after Gen. Heth's initial report. 133 In 1899, a BIA official admitted
that in its zeal to enroll as many children as possible in boarding
schools, the agency was forcing ill children from reservations into
boarding schools, thus spreading disease amongst healthy children.
The BIA official recognized that this conduct was tantamount to
murder. "The word 'murder' is a terrible word but we are little less
than murderers if we follow the course we are now following after
134
the attention of those in charge has been called to its fatal results."
A 1919 Report of the Indian Rights Association discusses 40 cases in
which employees who engaged in proven "misconduct, dishonesty,
incompetency, immorality, intemperance, unfitness and brutality
(such as stripping three girls to the waist and cruelly flogging
them)" were not fired.135 Instead, they were "allowed to resign or
were transferred and in some cases promoted." 136 A 1924 report by
the American Red Cross that contained a strong criticism of the
schools' health programs was "buried" by the Commissioner of
137
Indian Affairs.
As discussed above, in 1928 the government issued its own
report, the Meriam Report, which detailed at great length the
horrible living conditions and their dangerous effects on the
innocent children sent to the schools. In 1934, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, John Collier, and Secretary of the Interior Harold L.
Ickes sent memos "to Indian Service education personnel stating
that despite earlier regulations forbidding such practices, 'medieval
forms of discipline' still existed in Indian schools." 138 They had
evidence of the following violations: beatings by teachers; Indian
children compelled to kneel for many hours on concrete floors;
others required to stand for a quarter of a day immovable with their
1 39
eyes fixed on a dead wall.
Forty years after the Meriam report detailed the horrendous
conditions at the boarding schools the United States Senate
Subcommittee on Indian Education found that not much had
changed. In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee issued another scathing
133. REYHNER & EDER, supra note 9, at 94.

134. CHILD, supra note 43, at 57 (citing an excerpt from a letter written by Indian
Inspector William J. McConnell to the Secretary of the Interior, Oct. 31, 1899, quoted in
PUTNEY, supra note 120, at 10-11).
135. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: IT'S HISTORY,
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 72-73, n. 11 (1927).

136. Id.
137. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 135.
138. MANN, supra note 3, at 109 (citing memos from: John Collier to All Field
Supervisors of Education and Superintendent, August 23, 1934; Harold Ickes to
Superintendents, Principals and Teachers in the Indian Service, August 16, 1934, NARS

RG75, 00-34-801 CCF, GS).
139. Id.

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

report on the Indian boarding schools. That report found that
school buildings remained in severe states of disrepair. For
example, one building had a hole large enough for pigeons to fly
into the classrooms. 140 At one school, children lived in large stark
buildings, in some cases 16 to 20 children in a room, and in some
places, two children were forced to share a bed.141 In another
school, sick children continued to be sent to live with the healthy
children, thus making conditions ripe for contagious illnesses to
spread.1 42 At the Stewart School in Nevada, students reported that
there was a shortage of meat and that they avoided the cafeteria
food because of the worms and bugs in it.143 The schools were all
grossly understaffed. The Report noted that the American Academy
of Pediatrics recommended that the ratio of dorm aides to students
should be 1 to 15.144 Yet, in some schools, the ratio during the day
was 1 to 72 (assuming no one called in sick) and 1 to 180 to 260 at
night.1 45 As the report stated, "the lack of concern for basic needs of
the children is best expressed by the small number of dormitory
146
staff and is evident in many other aspects of dormitory life."
The 1969 Senate Report noted that dormitory aides, the only
possible parent substitutes, were instructed not to comfort and
counsel the children. 147 Even the few counselors employed by the
schools did not have time to do any counseling. One counselor
reported that he worked 10 to 16 hour days, spent 30%-40% of his
time retrieving runaways, 30% of this time supervising
housekeeping and other work; 5%-10% of his time doing banking
and financial paperwork, and the remainder of his time in meetings
148
or acting as a general service boy.
At one school, children reported being handcuffed for as long
as 18 hours in the dorm. They were handcuffed behind their back
from above or around a basement pillar or from a suspended
pipe. 149 One team member saw the permanent wrist scars on one
youngster's arms, the deformed hand of another boy and the
obviously broken and misshapen rib of yet another child. 150
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

1969 SENATE REPORT, supranote 59, at 67.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 60.

145. Id. At another school, there was one staff person for 90 children between 6:309:30 pm and after 9:30 one staff person for each dorm, with one dorm housing 350
children and the other housing 180. Id. at 299.

146. Id. at 61.
147. Id.

148. Id. at 62.
149. Id. at 311.
150. Id.
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Nor had the policy of cultural genocide changed. As the 1969
Senate report detailed, the schools continued to degrade American
Indian heritage and culture. Even in the 1960s, young children were
"suddenly removed from their culture and placed in the midst of
another which is presented as superior." 151 As the 1969 Senate
Report noted, a child enrolled in the federal school system attended
152
a school geared toward "making him a non-Indian."
The 1969 report about the problems at American Indian
boarding schools did little to change the way that the BIA ran the
schools. This is evident from a 1989 report of the Special Committee
on Investigations of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the
United States Senate. The Senate Committee preparing that report
found that the BIA "permitted a pattern of child abuse by its
teachers to fester throughout BIA schools nationwide." 15 3 Despite
the fact that for over 15 years it had become standard practice in all
50 states to require the reporting of child abuse, the BIA "failed to
issue any reporting guidelines for its own teachers." 54 It did not
155
require even minimal background checks for potential employees.
As a result, BIA "employed teachers who actually admitted past
child molestation, including at least one Arizona teacher who
explicitly listed a prior criminal offense for child abuse on his
employment form." 156 The BIA also "allowed pedophiles to
continue teaching even after they were reported to BIA school
officials." 157 Not only did the BIA refuse to investigate allegations of
child abuse and fail to report those allegations to law enforcement
authorities, in at least one instance, BIA officials actually threatened
persons making allegations with slander suits. 58 The 1989 Senate
Subcommittee noted in its report that the "BIA's negligence led to
needless cases of child molestation, yet many of the negligent
officials were actually promoted to higher positions." 159

151. Id. at 33.
152. Id.
153. STAFF OF SPEC. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SEN. SELECT COMM, ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (Comm.

Print 1989) [hereinafter 1989 SENATE REPORT].

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
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H. The Impact of Generations of Boarding School Abuses
The psychological impact of the boarding school system on
American Indians has not yet been seriously studied. However, in
Canada, which had a similar boarding schooling system, studies
indicate that many boarding school attendees suffer from symptoms
similar to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 160 Attendees'
symptoms often mirror those suffered by concentration camp
survivors or survivors of child abuse, domestic violence, rape, and
hostage situations.161 A recent study of 93 boarding school
survivors involved in litigation in Canada found that all but two
individuals had been diagnosed with a mental health disorder, with
nearly two-thirds of those studied diagnosed as suffering from
PTSD, and half of the PTSD cases were comorbid with related
mental illnesses, such a substance abuse disorder, major depression,
1 62
and dysthymic disorder.
Given the similarity of conditions between the Canadian and
United States' schools, it is likely that survivors of the United States'
schools suffer from many of the conditions noted by the Canadian
studies. This hypothesis is supported by the anecdotal evidence
currently available in the United States. Survivors of schools in this
country talk about the impact their schooling has had upon them.
As one boarding school attendee explained, "We didn't like
ourselves because we were Indian. We were bad. We were no
good. We were uneducated, illiterate. We were not going to
amount to anything." 163 This lack of identity and self-hatred has led
to predictable tragic results, including, in some cases, suicide.1 64 The

160. In Canada, some mental health experts have classified these symptoms as
For a detailed explanation of Boarding School
"Residential School Syndrome."
Syndrome and how it relates to PTSD, see Charles R. Brasfield, Boarding School Syndrome,
43(2) BRIT. COLUM. MED. J. 57 (2001), available at http://www.bcma.org/public
/bc-medical-journal/BCMJ/2001/march_2001/ResidentialSchoolSyndrome.asp.
161. CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 68-70 (summarizing authorities which describe the
symptoms of individuals traumatized in varying situations).
162. RAYMOND R. CORRADO, IRWIN M. COHEN & CORRADO RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION ASSOCIATES, INC., MENTAL HEALTH PROFILES FOR A SAMPLE OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA'S ABORIGINAL SURVIVORS OF THE CANADIAN BOARDING SCHOOL SYSTEM 50-51

(2003) (on file with the author), available at www.ahf.ca/assets/pdf/english/mental
health.pdf.
163. Kelley, supra note 1, at 3-4.
164. Id. at 4. Kelley reports the story of a boarding school attendee who killed himself
after leaving a message that said, "I don't know which world I belong in." Id. As the
victim's friend reported, this man in his 20s was "accused by his friend of being an
apple-red on the outside, white on the inside. And the struggle was too much for him."
Id. See also supra note 115 (discussing the connection between the boarding schools and
the high rate of American-Indian youth suicide).
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Senate Subcommittee noted in its 1969 Report:
The elementary school child who finds himself in a boarding
school has not yet fully developed his identity, his "I."
Psychologically, he will not be grown for many years. But, away
from family and familiar surroundings, placed in an institutional
setting, and processed from morning until bedtime day after day
and month after month, it hardly seems likely that the child will
emerge years later as a psychologically healthy unscathed adult. 165
The emotional devastation experienced by the attendees has
passed through generations. Children raised in harsh institutional
conditions had no parental role models. Suffering from the trauma
induced by their schooling, many boarding school attendees were
unable to give their own children the nurturing they needed. 166 In
addition to not having developed parenting skills because of their
institutionalization, many boarding school attendees developed
substance abuse problems. A 2003 study not surprisingly found
that abused American Indians and American Indians sent away to
67
school are more likely to have problems with alcohol later in life.'
In Canada, it is estimated that 85% of the indigenous clientele in
drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs today have been in

165. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 64.

166. This issue was first officially raised in the Meriam Report which found that
sending children away to the schools harmed the American-Indian family structure - it
hurt the children's parents and it had a significant negative impact on the children's
ability to later parent their own children. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 573-77. One
boarding school attendee's children asked her why she never hugged them. She simply
replied, "I never learned how." Kelley, supra note 1, at 4. The lack of parenting skills has
been identified as a unique feature of boarding school syndrome. See also, CORRADO ET
AL., supra note 162, at 36-37 (finding a significant percentage of boarding school
attendees did not know how to appropriately discipline their own children); see also 1969
SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 61 (discussing one expert's view that the boarding
experience has had numerous negative effects, including making it more difficult for
attendees to raise their own children).
167. See Mary P. Koss, et al, Adverse Childhood Exposures and Alcohol Dependence Among
Seven Native American Tribes, 25(3) AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 238 (2003) (finding that in
American-Indian men, the combination of childhood physical and sexual abuse
significantly increased the likelihood of subsequent alcohol dependence and for some,
childhood sexual abuse combined with boarding school attendance greatly increased the
odds of alcohol dependence); see also CORRADO ET AL., supra note 162, at 54 (noting that
87.5% of all those studied consumed alcohol during boarding school and about 90.9%
consumed it in the post-boarding school period); Brasfield, supra note 160, at 79 (noting
that a significant difference between PTSD and Residential School Syndrome is that
"there is a significant cultural impact and a persistent tendency to abuse alcohol or other
drugs that is particularly associated with violent outbursts of anger). For a discussion of
how substance abuse and alcoholism contribute to American-Indian youth suicide rates
see Manson et al., supra note 115.
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boarding schools.168 American-Indian alcoholism, along with lack of
"parenting skills," has been used as an excuse to take American
Indian-children from their parents and place those children in either
white adoptive or foster homes or in boarding schools, thus
perpetuating the destruction of the American-Indian peoples as
such. 169
The destruction of the American-Indian peoples due to
generations of boarding school attendees also can be seen in the rate
of sexual abuse suffered by American-Indian children. There has
been no empirical study on the extent of sexual abuse occurring at
United States' boarding schools. However, in similar schools in
Canada, various researchers have found that somewhere between
30% to 83% of the children attending boarding schools were abused
while at the schools. 170 The destructive impact of childhood sexual
abuse on anyone is horrendous. Because of the beliefs about how
the body, mind, and spirit are intertwined, a world view different
than that of most white children, childhood sexual abuse of
American-Indian children may have an even more profound impact
upon these children than it does on white children.
A study by Drs. Irwin and Roll on the effect of homosexual
molestation on American-Indian boys attending boarding schools
concluded that American-Indian boys abused at boarding schools
were even more profoundly effected than other childhood sexual
abuse survivors. 71 They concluded that the abuse had a profound
impact on American-Indian children because of their beliefs that: (1)
violation of their body necessarily includes a violation of their spirit;
(2) violation of taboos against sexual activity within the same gender
or across generational lines destroys natural harmony and balance;
and, (3) such sexual activity is the moral responsibility of the victim
as well as the perpetrator.172 These beliefs, combined with the
additional vulnerabilities created by American-Indian children's
status as members of a conquered minority, the prevalence of
problems of familial alcohol abuse, and high morbidity and
168. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 162, at 12.
169. See Problems That American Indian Families Face in Raising Their Children and How
These Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong. (Aug. 8-9, 1974)
(statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Association of American Indian
Affairs), available at http://liftingtheveil.org/byler.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
170. See CORRADO ET AL., supra note 162, at 55 (noting that of the boarding school
attendees involved in the study nearly 90% suffered some form of physical abuse while
attending the Canadian boarding schools).
171. Marc H. Irwin & Samuel Roll, The Psychological Impact of Sexual Abuse of Native
American Boarding School Children, 23(3) J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 461
(1995).
172. Id. at 462, 471-72.
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mortality rates, made these children more vulnerable, less able to
defend themselves from abuse, and more profoundly affected by
173
it.

They also found that these factors, combined with the close

community structure of American-Indian life, "may increase the
174
likelihood of victims in turn abusing another generation."
The wounds caused by the boarding school system are deep,
permanent and cross-generational lines. The schools have impacted
not only the individuals attending them, but the entire AmericanIndian peoples.
At least one United States government
representative explicitly recognized this impact. On September 8,
2000, Kevin Gover, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, made the following remarks in his statement at the
ceremony acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the
establishment of the BIA:
After the devastation of tribal economies and the deliberate
creation of tribal dependence on the services provided by this
agency, this agency set out to destroy all things Indian... This
agency forbade the speaking of Indian languages, prohibited the
conduct of traditional religions activities, outlawed traditional
government, and made Indian people ashamed of who they were.
Worst of all, the Bureau of Indian Affairs committed these acts
against the children entrusted to its boarding schools, brutalizing
them emotionally, psychologically, physically, and spiritually.
Even in this era of self-determination, when the Bureau of Indian
Affairs is at long last serving as an advocate for Indian people in
an atmosphere of mutual respect, the legacy of these misdeeds
haunts us. The trauma of shame, fear and anger has passed from
one generation to the next, and manifests itself in the rampant
alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence that plague Indian
Country. Many of our people live lives of unrelenting tragedy as
Indian families suffer the ruin of lives by alcoholism, suicide
made of shame and despair, and violent death at the hands of one
another. So many of the maladies suffered today in Indian
country result from the failures of this agency.
Poverty,
ignorance, and disease have been the product of this agency's
work. And so today, I stand before you as the leader of an
institution that in the past has committed acts so terrible that they
infect, diminish, and destroy the lives of Indian people decades
later, generations later. These things occurred despite the efforts
of many good people with good hearts who sought to prevent
them. These wrongs must be acknowledged if the healing is to
begin... On behalf of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, I extend this
173. Irwin & Roll, supra note 171, at 461, 471-72; see also CORRADO ET AL., supra note
162, at 13 (citing studies showing that many indigenous children abused in boarding
schools have grown to become abusers themselves, something often attributed to the
shame and guilt inflicted upon these individuals during their time in boarding schools).
174. Id. at 472.
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formal 17
apology
to Indian People for the historical conduct of this
5
agency.

The words of this government employee aptly summarize what
has happened as a result of government policies. If the United
States government itself admitted the inter-generational harm
caused by its policies and sought to repair the damage and begin a
healing process, there would be no need to discuss legal recourse.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The government's lack of
recognition of its wrongdoing and its failure to redress these wrongs
means that American Indians must look to other avenues of
recourse. One such avenue is the courts.
176
III. Legal Recourse

Given the long-lasting and devastating impact of the atrocities
committed by the American government against American-Indian
children and American-Indian peoples the question then becomes
one of identifying a basis for legal recourse. As was stated in
Marbury v. Madison, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection." 177 Clearly, not only young
children, but an entire peoples, were seriously and permanently
wronged. As a nation of laws, and one that purports to decry
175. Kevin Gover, 39(2) J. OF AM. INDIAN EDuc. 4, 4-6 (2000). In his remarks
addressing Tribal Leaders at the Ceremony Acknowledging the 17t h Anniversary of the

Establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs on Sept. 8, 2000, Gover made clear that he
was speaking on behalf of the BIA, not on behalf of the federal government itself. Id.

176. The claims discussed in this section potentially may be brought as class actions.
For an excellent review of bringing class action claims for international human rights
violations, see Van Schaack, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 6. For a model class action
complaint see Snopczyk v. Volkswagen AG, No. 99-472 (E.D. Wisc. Filed May 05, 1999) (on
file with the author), available at http://www.angelfire.com/nj/odszkodowania/

snopczyk.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). This complaint is a class action claim against
Volkswagen for atrocities committed against children during WWII. For a discussion of
class actions for Tucker Act claims - claims that may require an exhaustion of
administrative remedies, see generally Elizabeth S. Hess, Comment, Administrative
Exhaustion and Class Actions: Rules, Rights, Requirements, Remedies and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act Issue Resolved, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 773 (2003).

This article does not address potential claims against the various churches that ran
some of the boarding schools. Those claims would be similar to claims brought against
the churches for the actions of pedophile priests and other employees. For a discussion
of bringing claims against churches for sexual assault and abuse, see John H. Arnold,
Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FL. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 25 (1996).
177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,163 (1803).
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human rights abuses worldwide, 178 there should be no question but
that it is the responsibility of the United States to ensure that those
our government has injured have a legal remedy, either through the
judicial system or through an Act of Congress.
This section of the article addresses judicial system remedies by
exploring some of the potential legal claims available to boarding
school attendees. 179 It begins with a discussion of Tucker Act claims.
This Act allows for claims for breach of treaty provisions, in this
case, the applicable provision being one for damages claims when
"bad men" amongst whites cause injury to Indians. 180 This section
reviews why the "bad men" claims encompass recovering damages
for physical and sexual abuse, and may encompass recovery for
damages caused by institutional neglect. This section then discusses
how the Tucker Act's requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies may avert the statute of limitations defense. It also
discusses overcoming other anticipated defenses, such as the
assertion of the plenary power defense.
This section next discusses Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
claims, including a claim against the government for its breach of
duty to protect and care for the American-Indian children while
they were in government-run boarding schools. The discussion
about FTCA claims addresses ways to overcome the statute of
limitations defense and the defense that the government's actions
were within its discretionary function powers.
The last piece in this section reviews a broad range of potential
domestic law claims based upon violations of international human
rights norms. It begins with a discussion of how the facts of these
cases support a claim for genocide.
It then discusses other
international law claims such as claims for torture, cruel and
178. See, e.g., United States Department of State web page on Human Rights which
states: "The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the
establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S.
foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United States Department of State, Under
Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, Human Rights, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
Each year, the Department of State compiles and places on its website a report
cataloging and denouncing human rights violations committed by other countries.
179. This section deals with what the author believes are the most viable potential
claims. It does not purport to thoroughly exhaust all potentially available claims against
the government. For example, if all other claims fail, boarding school attendees who
have been sexually or physically assaulted could consider a Bivens claim for violation of
their Fourteenth amendment liberty interest in bodily integrity. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding students have a Fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in being free from teachers' sexually assaultive conduct and
allowing a § 1983 claim to proceed).
180. For a sample "bad men" clause, see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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inhuman and degrading treatment and claims based upon violation
of customary international law norms with regard to fundamental
rights of children.
Finally, it explains why boarding school
attendees might have an international law claim for a failure to
redress wrongs. This subsection of the article concludes with an
exploration of ways to get around the statute of limitations and
political question defenses that inevitably will be raised in the
international law claims. Thus, this section on "legal recourse"
provides the reader with numerous ways to conceptualize a legal
framework for claims against the United States for large scale
human rights abuses committed against people living within this
country's borders.
A. Tucker Act Claims 181
1.

Basis of Tucker Act claim: Breach of "Bad Men" Clause Treaty
Provision

Many treaties between American Indian nations and the United
States government contain the following clause, commonly known
as a "bad men" clause:
If bad men among whites, or among other people subject to the
authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the
person or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon
proof made to the agent and forwarded to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs at Washington City, proceed at once to cause the
offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the
United States
and also reimburse the injured person for the loss
82
sustained.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2006) prevents plaintiff from combining Tucker Act claims with
the other claims discussed in this article. Thus, if boarding school attendees want to file
a Tucker Act claim along with other claims, they must file two separate suits. In doing
so, they need to be aware of a procedural pitfall: if there is a tort or other claim pending
against the United States that arises from the same operative facts and requests at least
some overlapping relief, the Federal Court of Claims will dismiss the Tucker Act
lawsuit. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 202 (1993). On the other hand, if the
plaintiff first files the Tucker Act claim and then files a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
or other claim in district court, the district court claims may not divest the Federal Court
of Claims of its earlier established Tucker Act claims jurisdiction. See Hardwick Bros.
Co. v. United States (Hardwick I),72 F.3d 883 (Fed Cir. 1995). For more information
about this procedural quagmire, see generally Paul F. Kirgis, Section 1500 and the
JurisdictionalPitfalls of Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV.301 (1997).
182. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Northern Cheyenne and
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In addition to the fact that treaties are the "supreme law of the
land" 183 and are the basis for domestic law claims based upon
violation of international law,18 4 the Supreme Court has held that a
treaty with an American Indian nation also is a contract. 185 The
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, gives the United States Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction over any claim against the United States
founded upon any express or implied contract with the United
States. 186 The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive right
for money damages. Rather, the substantive right must be found in
some other source of law which "can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damages sustained." 187 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
lengthy well-reasoned decision, held that a "bad men" treaty clause
is a money-mandating source of law for a Tucker Act claim and
individual American Indians may rely upon that treaty clause in
88
asserting Tucker Act claims against the United States.
The parameters of claims based upon the "bad men" clause
have not yet been fully defined. At present, it is clear that the clause
provides compensation for harmful acts of both whites and nonwhites who are working for the federal government at the time of
the alleged wrong 189 and it encompasses acts of physical and sexual
abuse and damages resulting there from. 90 However, it is an open
question as to whether the claims based upon the emotional injuries
arising from years spent in living conditions which, at best, can be
Northern Arapaho Tribes of Indian, art. I, May 10, 1868, 15 Stats. 655, available at
This website
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/norlOl2.htm.
contains Charles J. Kappler's compilation of all treaties with American Indians. The
"bad men" clause cited above is virtually identical to "bad men" clauses in other treaties
with American Indians.
183. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2
184. See infra Part III.C.
185. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
187. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002,
1009 (1967))).
188. Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393, 395-96 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (involving a sexual
abuse claim occurring at government run hospital located on an American Indian
reservation).
189. The bad men clause, by its terms, applies to whites and non-whites. See supra
note 182 and accompanying text (quoting typical bad men clause).
190. Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 397 (recognizing that bad men treaty clause encompassed a
claim for sexual abuse). Accord, Begay v. United States (Begay ), 219 Ct. Cl. 599 (1979)
(physical and sexual abuse); Hebah v. United States, 192 Ct. C1. 785, 787-88 (1970)
(wrongful death).
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characterized as institutionally neglectful and, at worst, can be
characterized as genocidal' 91 are also covered by the clause.
On the one hand, the plain language of the treaty clause refers
to "any wrong" and thus would assumedly apply to claims for
emotional distress damages resulting from either the destruction of
cultural identity or the schools' harsh living conditions. However,
any emotional distress claim is likely to be challenged on the ground
that the objective of treaties containing the "bad men" clause was to
obtain peace between warring Indian nations and the United States.
The "bad men" clause was a part of that peacemaking effort 92 and
neither party to the treaty anticipated that peacemaking allowed for
emotional distress damages caused by white men. Rather, the intent
of the clause was to compensate American Indians for physical
harm inflicted by "bad men" amongst whites because that is what
would destroy the peacemaking purpose of the treaty. 193 How a
court responds to this argument depends upon how broadly the
court reads the "bad men" clause. Courts have not limited claims
available under the clause to those falling within the treaties'
peacemaking objective. For example, in Begay II, the court permitted
Navajo school children harmed by a government teacher to file a
claim under the "bad men" clause. 194 Additionally, in Tsosie, an
American-Indian woman harmed by the alleged sexual abuse of a
doctor who was working at a government-run reservation hospital
was allowed to pursue a "bad men" clause claim.195 Whether courts
are willing to go the next step and allow purely emotional distress
claims remains to be seen. However, Tsosie and Begay II presumably
encompassed emotional distress damages that accompanied the
physical injuries, so it would not be a tremendous leap to interpret
the clause to allow claims for emotional injuries based upon the
horrendous living conditions. 196 However, it may be more difficult
191. For a discussion of why the government's conduct falls within the international
law prohibition against genocide, see infra Part III.C.1.
192. Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 398-400 (discussing the history underlying the bad men treaty
clauses).
193. The government also may try to reassert its unsuccessful argument in Tsosie that
since the peacemaking function of the treaty had been achieved, the bad men clause
generally is no longer necessary. This argument was rejected by the Tsosie court, and as
Professor Newton notes, had the court mistakenly accepted the argument, it would have
laid the groundwork for eviscerating all American Indian treaties. Nell Jessup Newton,
Indian Claims In the Courtsof the Conqueror,41 AM. U.L. REv. 753, 836 (1992)
194. Begay v. United States (Begay I/), 224 Ct. Cl. 712 (1980) (allowing claim by
children based upon bad men's treaty clause but dismissing the claim because Interior
Department found against the plaintiffs and that finding was not arbitrary or
capricious).
195. Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 395-97.
196. For a discussion of how state courts handle emotional injury claims and thus for
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to argue that the clause extends to emotional distress claims based
upon the loss of cultural identity because of the plenary power
defense.
2.

Plenary Power Doctrine

The courts created the plenary power doctrine to give the
political branches of government full and complete power over
actions taken with regard to American Indians, immigrants, and
colonized territories. 197 A complete explanation of the genesis of the
plenary power doctrine and the harms it has created is beyond the
scope of this article. 198 Suffice it to say that this doctrine has been
used numerous times in cases involving American Indian nations to
justify the government's violation of both the constitution and
international law.199 In the boarding school claims cases, the plenary
power doctrine will be used to argue that the decision on how to
handle American Indian affairs, and in particular the boarding
schools, was an executive branch decision over which the judiciary
has no power. 200 This argument will be used to attempt to defeat all
claims, and especially to defeat any claim based upon emotional
distress arising from the government's assimilationist policies, given
that those policies ostensibly were aimed at helping AmericanIndian children.
While challenges to the legitimacy of the government's
boarding school program as a whole may be defeated by the
government's plenary power over American Indian affairs 201 the
doctrine cannot be used as a blanket justification for practices which
constitute genocide, 2 2 torture, 20 3 or child abuse. 20 4 Even if the
some useful analogies, see infra Part III.B.1(b), notes 270-74.
197. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the "Other": Indians, Immigrants,
Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 427, 429-30 (2002).

198. For a more in depth analysis of the plenary power doctrine, see id.; see also Nell
Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195 (1984).
199. See Saito, supra note 198; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality
After September 11? American JurisprudenceConfronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 52-54 (2002).

200. See, e.g., Nat'l Indian Youth Council Intermountain Indian Sch. Chapter v. Bruce,
485 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding plenary power doctrine divested federal court of
jurisdiction to hear claim seeking replacement of BIA-run Navajo boarding school with
adequate on-reservation schools).
201. See generally Saito, supra note 197, at 427; Newton, supra note 199.
202. For a discussion of how the government's conduct constituted genocide, see infra
Part III.C.1.
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government successfully argues that it could mandate the nature
and structures of American Indian education, indeed especially if it
does so, it has a concomitant responsibility to do so in a manner
which is truly in the best interests of those it claims as its "wards."205
Conduct such as that described in section II, supra, could hardly be
deemed in the best interest of the child. It would be a perverse
result to insulate the government from liability by claiming that this
conduct was in the executive branches' plenary power.
In sum, even if the "bad men" clause claims for emotional
distress based upon attempts at cultural destruction are dismissed
because assimilationist goals were within the plenary power of the
government, boarding school attendees should have a "bad men"
claim for emotional and physical injuries sustained due to the living
conditions described in Section II. These conditions were certainly
not in the children's best interests. The government should not be
able to claim that its plenary power extends to conduct, that if
engaged in by individuals, would constitute child abuse, or to
conduct that violates rules and regulations it promulgated for the
20 6
safety and protection of the children in its care.
3.

Tucker Act Statute of LimitationsIssues

Since almost all of the government controlled boarding schools
closed their doors over 20 years ago, those harmed as a result of
attending the schools face significant statute of limitations issues.
Under 28 U.S.C. Section 2501, a Tucker Act claim must be brought in
the Federal Court of Claims within six years of when the claim first
accrues. The question is: When does the claim first accrue?
The language of the "bad men" treaty provision requires that
the claim must first be presented to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (now the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian
Affairs). 207 This phrase has been interpreted to mean that all
203. For a discussion of how the government's conduct comes within international
prohibitions against torture, see infra Part III.C.2.
204. For a discussion of how the government's conduct constitutes child abuse, see
infra Part III.B.1, notes 261-64, 268 and accompanying text.
205. Our courts have long declared that American Indians are "wards" of the United
States government. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 529-30 (2000).
206. For a discussion of how much of what happened at the schools constituted child
abuse, see infra text accompanying notes 261-64, 268. For a discussion of how much of
the conduct violated the government's own rules and regulations see infra text
accompanying notes 308-13 and 315-19.
207. 43 C.F.R. § 4.2 (2005) contains the rules governing hearings and appeals before
the Department of the Interior.
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administrative remedies must be exhausted before a Tucker Act
claim may be filed. 20 8 If, in fact, there is a mandatory exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement for claims based upon a "bad
men" treaty clause, this requirement provides a way to avert a
statute of limitations defense.
Federal courts have held that when there is a mandatory
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, a Tucker Act
claim does not begin to accrue until the administrative body hearing
the claim issues its final decision. 209 The reason for this accrual rule
is that the Court of Claims has limited judicial review in mandatory
administrative exhaustion of remedies cases. The Court of Claims
only may overturn the administrative decision if it was "arbitrary,
capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence." 210 Since the
Court of Claims only looks at the validity of the administrative
decision, until that decision is issued, the plaintiff does not know
what claim she has or on what grounds the administrative action
may be vulnerable. 21' "It is only then that his claim or right to bring
a civil action against the United States matures." 212 The Federal
Circuit Appeals Court employed this rule in one recent Tucker Act
claim. In Chambers v. U.S.,213 a serviceman was discharged in 1970.
In 1987, he discovered that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD).214 In 1999, he filed a claim with the military
review board seeking to reopen his file and be re-classified as a
disability discharge. 21 5 In 2000, the military review board denied his
claim.216 In 2003, the serviceman filed a Tucker Act claim. The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the law upon
which the serviceman based his claim required a mandatory
208. See Zephier, No. 03-768L (Fed. Cl. Oct. 29, 2004) (order dismissing boarding
school attendees' Tucker Act claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see
also Begay 1, 219 Ct. Cl. 599 (1979) (suspending bad men claim proceedings to allow
Department of Interior to administratively review boarding school plaintiffs' sexual
abuse claims); Begay II, 224 Ct. Cl. 712 (1980) (dismissing boarding school plaintiffs'
abuse claims for failure to fully prosecute their claims at the administrative hearing
level).
209. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 511 (1967).
210. Id. at 513. See also Begay II, 224 Ct. Cl. 712 (suspending proceedings in boarding
school abuse claimants case in order to give the Department of Interior time to hear the
claim and issue an opinion).
211. Crown Coat, 386 U.S. at 513-14.
212. Id. at 514 (noting that the claim accrues only when the events occur that are
necessary to enable the plaintiff to bring suit; if there is a mandatory exhaustion of
remedies, the claim only accrues after the plaintiff has exhausted his or her
administrative remedies).
213. 417 F.3d 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
214. Id. at 1221.
215. Id. at 1222.
216. Id.
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exhaustion of administrative remedies, the federal courts did not
have jurisdiction until the appropriate administrative board issues
its final decision.217 Thus, the serviceman's claim was not barred by
the statute of limitations because
he had filed within six years of the
218
review board's final decision.
Courts have not yet definitively decided that a Tucker Act claim
based upon a "bad men" treaty clause requires a mandatory
However, numerous
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
decisions indicate a trend toward requiring an exhaustion of
219
administrative remedies.
If the "bad men" clause treaty provision is definitively
interpreted as requiring mandatory exhaustion of administrative
remedies then boarding school attendees must file administrative
claims with the appropriate agency within the Department of the
Interior. It is only after that agency makes its final decision that the
statute of limitations on the plaintiffs' Tucker Act claims will begin
to run. Thus, if there is a mandatory exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement for "bad men" clause claims, boarding school
attendees should be able to avert the statute of limitations defense.
However, the government may attempt to dismiss the claims on
laches or on other equitable grounds. To succeed with a laches
defense, the defendant must prove an inexcusable delay by plaintiff
in bringing suit and prejudice to the defendant due to the delay. 220
The laches argument was raised and rejected in Tsosie v. United
States,221 a claim based upon the "bad men" treaty clause. The Tsosie
court rejected the laches argument because laches is not usually
applied in contract cases, has almost never been used in Indian
222
claim cases, and was not warranted under the facts of the case.
Laches should only come into play if the boarding school
attendees raise an equitable tolling argument. 223 To the extent a
217. Id. at 1222-23.
218. Id. at 1227.
219. See Zephier, No. 03-768L (Fed. Cl. Oct. 29, 2004) (order dismissing boarding
school attendees' Tucker Act claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see
also Begay 1, 219 Ct. Cl. 599 (1979) (suspending bad men claim proceedings to allow
Department of Interior to administratively review boarding school plaintiffs' sexual
abuse claims); Begay II, 224 Ct. Cl. 712 (1980) (dismissing boarding school plaintiffs'
abuse claims for failure to fully prosecute their claims at the administrative hearing
level).
220. Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951).
221. 11 Cl. Ct. 62, 71 (1986).
222. Id. at 72. See also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 245
n.16 (1985) (noting that it would be very novel to use the equitable doctrine of laches in a
case at law).
223. See, e.g., Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 170 (8th Cir.
1995) (noting that laches is unavailable to bar claims for legal relief governed by statute
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laches defense is raised, and the government asserts it is unduly
prejudiced because it will have a difficult time locating witnesses
and evidence, boarding school attendees should point to the many
civil and criminal sexual abuse cases that have been filed against
priests and churches. 224 They also should bring to the court's
attention the myriad of class action suits brought in the late 1990s
against those profiting from the Nazi regime in World War 11.225
Those decades-old claims were allowed to proceed, giving the
plaintiffs the opportunity to gather the necessary evidence to pursue
the claims.
In the boarding school cases, a lot of the evidence rests in the
government's hands. It has easier access to documentary evidence
that will support or negate the claims, as well as access to evidence
regarding the last known whereabouts of key witnesses. In any
given case, the government should at least be forced to prove that it
cannot locate key witnesses or find important evidence rather than
simply being allowed to succeed on this defense with a vague claim
of prejudice. Additionally, boarding school attendees should point
out that the real prejudice and burden rests upon them. If they
cannot gather the necessary evidence to support their claims, the
claims will be dismissed for lack of proof. That is a more equitable
solution than a technical procedural dismissal in cases where the
government has equal or greater access to most of the evidence.
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 contains a tolling provision for those
suffering from a legal disability. 226 This potentially covers emotional
disabilities which make it impossible for boarding school attendees
to have filed suit earlier. However, it is extremely difficult to toll a
claim under this provision and, unless boarding school attendees
of limitations, and only comes into play either in equitable claims or in cases in which

the plaintiff seeks to extend the statute of limitations by using an equitable principle
such as fraudulent concealment).
224. See Powel v. Chaminade College Prep, No. ED84366, 2005 WL 1266801, at *1 (Mo.
App. E.D. May 31, 2005) (order allowing case from 1970s to go forward to decide if
plaintiff knew or should have known of the abuse); Guertin v. McAvoy, No. 042004,
2005 WL 1009649, at *1 (Mass. Mar. 7, 2005) (order allowing students at school for deaf in
1960s - 1970s to go forward with abuse suit); see also Thomas P. Doyle and Stephen C.
Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 549, 551
(2004) (noting that since 1984, there have been about 3,000 cases related to clergy abuse
in the United States and the vast majority of those cases resulted in settlement rather
than trial).
225. See Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-EraLitigation in
American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002) (discussing litigation in the late 1990s
seeking to provide payments to survivors of slave labor and forced labor camps during
WWII and litigation brought in the 1990s against banks and corporations who profited
from the Nazi regime).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006) (providing that those suffering from a legal disability
have three years after the disability has been removed in which to file a claim).
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actually suffered from repressed memories of the abuse, it is
unlikely to provide boarding school attendees with a successful
227
avenue for avoiding a statute of limitations defense.
In sum, although Tucker Act "bad men" clause claims present
many legal hurdles and challenges, boarding school attendees who
belong to American Indian nations that have a treaty containing a "bad
men" clause have potentially viable claims based upon that clause.
B.

FTCA Claim for Breach of Duty to Protect 228

Another possible avenue of redress for victims of large scale
human rights abuses committed by the United States government
may be the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Enacted in 1945, the
227. See, e.g., Coon v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 531, 539-540 (1994) (noting that in
order to toll the statute of limitations under the legal disability provision of 28 U.S.C. §
2501, plaintiff must demonstrate an inability to care for his or her property, an inability
to transact business, or an inability to understand the nature of his or her legal rights
and liabilities, and finding that plaintiff who had bipolar disorder but had periods of
lucidity was not legally disabled); accord Waldorf v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 321, 324
(1985) (finding diagnosed schizophrenic not legally disabled because he had periods of
lucidity). But see generally Annotation, Posttraumatic Syndrome as Tolling Running of
Statute of Limitations, 12 A.L.R. FED. 5TH 546 (2004) (surveying cases in which plaintiffs
attempted to use their PTSD diagnosis to toll the statute of limitations). "A principal
distinguishing feature accounting for the cases' different results seems to be the
credibility of the assertion that the plaintiff's alleged traumatic or posttraumatic neurosis
or syndrome actually did preclude or delay awareness of the claimed harm." Id. § 2. See
also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Running of Limitations Against Action for Civil
Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child, 9 A.L.R. FED. 5TH 321, 322 § 11[a] (2005) (citing cases
which reject the plaintiff's argument that his or her psychological distress should toll the
statute of limitations). But see id. § 11[b] (citing cases where courts have held plaintiffs
should be allowed to introduce evidence of repressed memories or other severe
psychological disabilities as grounds for tolling the statute of limitations).
228. In addition to a claim for breach of duty to protect boarding school attendees
who were physically or sexually assaulted by school employees and who attended
schools located in Ninth Circuit, students may also have an FTCA negligent hiring and
retention claim if they have evidence the school knew or should have known about the
abuser's propensities. See Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1996). Many
other circuits have held these claims are barred by the intentional tort exception to the
FTCA because they are, in essence, assault and battery claims. See, e.g., Guccione v.
United States, 847 F.2d 1031 (2nd Cir. 1988); Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th
Cir. 1986). In bringing a negligent hiring and retention claim, a boarding school
attendee would have to overcome the fact that most courts find that hiring and retention
decisions fall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. See Gordon ex rel.
Gordon v. Ottumwa Cmty. School Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (S.D. Iowa 2001)
(citing cases finding a discretionary function bar to negligent hiring and retention
claims). But see Doe ex rel. Doe v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 652 N.W.2d 439, 445
(Iowa 2002) (refusing to perfunctorily apply the discretionary function exception to
negligent hiring and retention cases in which a school had notice of a teacher's abusive
conduct).
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FTCA is a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity for
negligence committed by government employees in the course and
scope of their employment. Unlike common law tort claims, FTCA
claims must first be brought before the appropriate government
agency, 229 which in the case of boarding school attendees, would be
the Department of Interior.
Upon the agency's denial or
unsatisfactory resolution, or failure to act upon the claim, plaintiffs
have six months in which to file suit in federal district court. 230 The
substantive tort law governing an FTCA suit is the law of the state
231
where the act or omission occurred.
Unlike state tort law actions, plaintiffs with FTCA claims cannot
file suit for harms caused by intentional torts 232 or
misrepresentation. 233 Thus victims of human rights abuses must
find a way to fashion negligence claims if they want to pursue a
remedy under the FTCA. In the case of boarding school attendees,
that means they will not be able to file FTCA claims for assault,
battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort. Instead,
as discussed herein, they must frame their claims as a negligent
breach of the duty to protect the children entrusted to them. This
section discusses how to frame a negligence claim and it discusses
the likely defenses to that claim: statute of limitations and the
discretionary function defense.
1.

Breach of FiduciaryDuty and Duty to Protect

Boarding school attendees have a potential negligence claim
under the FTCA: a claim for breach of the government's duty to
protect the children. To prevail, they must prove the elements of a
negligence claim: duty, breach, causation and damages.
The
following section describes how they might prove each element of
this claim.

229. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2000).
230. Id. The agency can either deny the claim in writing, or, if after six months from
the time the claim is filed, the claimant has not received any notice of final disposition of
the claim, the claimant may deem the claim has been denied. Id.
231. Id. § 1346(b)(1). In the boarding school cases courts hearing FTCA claims must
apply the law of the state in which the school was located. Since state tort laws vary,
different rules of substantive tort law will apply depending upon where the school was
located. Id.
232. Id. § 2680(h).
233. Id.
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Duty to Boarding School Children

In the boarding school cases, there are two ways to characterize
the government's duty to the children.
The first way to
conceptualize the government's duty is as a fiduciary duty to act in
the children's best interests. In 1831, Chief Justice Marshall declared
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,234 that American Indians were wards
and the U.S. government was their guardian. Since then, courts
repeatedly have stated that the relationship between the federal
government and the American Indian is like that between a
guardian and his ward, thereby placing the American Indian in a
peculiar and protected status. 235 The government's fiduciary duty
runs to individual American Indians as well as to American Indian
236
nations.
A fiduciary relationship means that the fiduciary must be loyal
to the interests of the beneficiary and must act to further the
beneficiary's best interests. 237 Usually, the fiduciary duty principle
is raised in the context of financial dealings. However, one could
argue that the fiduciary duty extends to the duty to protect the
American-Indian children living in government controlled boarding
schools because, in that instance, the American-Indian children
literally became the wards of the government. 238 Assuming the
relevant state law recognizes a breach of fiduciary duty claim, as
most states do, 23 9 the standard of care would be that of a fiduciary to
its beneficiary.
A breach of fiduciary duty claim was permitted in a FTCA
234. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
235. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495, 529-30 (2000); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (1977).

236. U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983).
237. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988).
238. Courts have held a fiduciary relationship exists between guardian and ward.
See, e.g., Noah v. Enesco Corp., 911 F. Supp. 299, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Matlock v. Simpson,
902 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tenn. 1995); Hoffman v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 442

N.W.2d 1231 (Iowa 1989).
239. See generally Annotation, Causes of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R. 4TH 750
(discussing state law clergy malpractice claims, many of which include breach of
fiduciary duty claims); see also Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 323 (Col.
1993) (holding the First Amendment did not bar breach of fiduciary duty claim for
inappropriate sexual relationship between parishioner and priest who counseled her);
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409,430 (2d Cir. 1999)
(allowing breach of fiduciary duty claim in sexual abuse case); Doe v. Evans III, 814 So.
2d 370, 375-77 (Fla. 2002) (holding that First Amendment did not bar parishoner's breach
of fiduciary duty claim against bishop, church and diocese for pastoral sexual
misconduct during counseling); accord F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 561, 696 A.2d 697

(1997); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D.Tex. 1995).
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wrongful death case. In Marlys Bear Medicine,240 plaintiff's decedents
brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) alleging that the government's failure to make
sure safety practices were communicated and used during
government-controlled timbering operations caused their mother's
death. The Ninth Circuit upheld the plaintiffs' right to bring the
breach of fiduciary duty claim, noting: "when a fiduciary duty
exists, the party in the stronger position owes an obligation by
virtue of the trust relationship to act in the best interests of the
beneficiary... The BIA, with its "pervasive" and "comprehensive"
control over the Blackfeet timbering operations... had a duty to
ensure that basic safety practices were communicated and used at
the logging site." 241 The reasoning in Marlys Bear Medicine applies to
the children in boarding schools with even greater force.
The government had complete control over the management of
the schools. Children had no freedom to act in their own interest or
for their own safety. The government owed the children an
obligation to act in their best interests. Boarding school attendees
certainly can allege that forcing them to attend schools in which
they were physically and emotionally abused was not in their best
interests and was a breach of the government's fiduciary duty.
Related to the government's fiduciary duty is the special duty
to the American-Indian children that it took into its custody and
placed in boarding schools. The Restatement Second of Torts §
314A provides that one has a duty to protect another from
unreasonable risk of harm if one is required by law, or one
voluntarily undertakes the custody of another "such as to deprive
the other of his normal opportunities for protection." 242 Some states
find that this duty arises in situations in which there is a "special
relationship" which includes the relationship of student and teacher.
For instance, in Arizona -a state home to several American Indian
boarding schools -a duty to protect arises where there is a special
relationship between the defendant and the victim, such as
243
guardian-ward or teacher-student.
In FTCA cases, a special duty to protect has been found in cases
involving claims by children who were molested while in
240. 241 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2001).
241. Id. at 1219-20.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
243. Bloxham v. Glock, Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 199, 203 Ariz. 271, 274 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Fedie v. Travelodge Int'l Inc., 162 Ariz. 263, 265 (App. 1989), 732 P.2d 739, 741);
numerous other states have adopted this standard, see, e.g., Claybon v. Midwest
Petroleum Co., 819 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1991); Doe v. Linder Const. Co., Inc.,
845 S.W.2d 173, 197 (Tenn. 1992); Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 874 P.2d 861, 865 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994);
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government-run day care centers. 244 In Doe v. Scott,245 and in Doe v.

United States,246 children who had been sexually molested while
attending government-run day care centers brought negligence
claims under the FTCA for the government's failure to protect them
from the molesters. In these cases, the government consistently
argued that the plaintiffs were trying to reshape an assault claim,
which is barred by the FTCA, into a negligence claim. 247 The courts
rejected this argument because they found that when the
government assumed the responsibility of caring for the children, it
owed them a special duty to protect them from all kinds of
foreseeable harm. 248 In both cases, the courts found that the
government assumed a special duty of care to protect the children
by operating the day care249center and that this duty and its breach
arose prior to the assault.
The same reasoning should be applied to the boarding school
cases. Like in the day care cases, the government assumed custody
of the children and in so doing, it made their parents an implicit, if
not explicit, promise that it would properly care for their children.
Additionally, government agents physically confined the children to
the schools and often prevented them from contacting their
parents.2 50 Given these facts, the special duty standard should
apply.
At a minimum, the lowest standard of duty - that to 251use
reasonable care to protect the children against foreseeable harm

-

244. Doe v. Scott, 652 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Doe v. United States, 838
F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1988)
245. 652 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
246. 838 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1988).
247. 652 F. Supp. at 550; 838 F.2d at 222.
248. 652 F. Supp at 551-52; 838 F.2d at 222-23.
249. Doe v. Scott, 652 F. Supp. at 551; Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d at 224; see also
Harris v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 91, 94-96 (D. P.R., 1992) (holding intentional tort
exception did not bar action by children harmed by a teacher at a Naval base school
because the government owed a duty to the plaintiffs created by its running of the
school and assuming custody of the children).
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965), which notes that when one
voluntarily takes someone into custody and deprives him of the power of self-protection
or subjects him to association with those likely to harm him, the actor is under a duty of
care to control the third person and prevent the harm if the actor has the ability to
control the third person and knows of the necessity of doing so. The commentary to this
rule states that because a school child is deprived of the protection of his parents or
guardian, the actor who takes custody of the child is required to give him the protection
which his or her parents or guardian would provide. For a discussion of how children
were physically confined to the school and "captured" if they went "AWOL," see supra
text accompanying notes 88-90. For a discussion of how the children were prevented
from contacting their parents, see supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
251. See Id. § 282 (1965) (setting out the basic negligence standard).

Fall 20061

CIVIL CLAIMS FOR UNCIVILIZED ACTS

will apply. Even this standard arguably requires the schools to take
the necessary steps to prevent disease or physical and sexual and
psychological abuse.
In the boarding school cases, framing the duty as a "duty to
protect" is critical because, under the FTCA, the government waives
its immunity for personal injuries caused by government employees
only if the employees were acting within the scope of their
employment at the time of the injury. 252 Thus, if the claims were
predicated upon individual boarding school employees' physically
or sexually abusive acts, the employees' conduct may well be
deemed to be outside the scope of employment. 253 However, when
the claims are premised on the government's failure to protect the
children in its care, the wrongful conduct involves the entire manner
in which the children were cared for, not the wrongful acts of
specific individuals. 254 From that perspective, the government
cannot escape liability by claiming the misconduct of individual
staffers who harmed or sexually abused the children was outside
the scope of their employment since the conduct at issue is not
conduct of individuals, per se, but conduct of the entire institutional
system administered by the BIA.
b.

Breach of Duty to Boarding School Children

Boarding school attendees must also prove the government
breached its duty to protect them and that this breach was a
proximate cause of their injury. There is a foreseeability of harm
element both in terms of the duty and the causation element. 255 To
prove foreseeability, the boarding school attendees must show that
the government knew or should have known of the likelihood of
harm. 256 In some cases, the foreseeability issue will be easily proven.
For example, in some cases involving physical injury and/or sexual
252. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
253. See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, 769 P.2d 948, 964 (CA 1989)
(claim based upon sexual or physical assaults not within the school employee's "course
and scope of employment"); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993)

(noting that when priests engage in sexual relationships with parishioners, they are not
acting within the course and scope of their employment).
254. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta, 102 Cal. App. 4th 899, 918 (2002) (finding that

in police-sponsored youth training program, police department was not vicariously
liable for officer's sexual abuse, but allowing a negligent supervision claim to go

forward); Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420,425 (Wash. 1997) (distinguishing
between vicarious liability cases and cases alleging breach of duty to protect).
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)TORTS § 282, cmts. g, h (1965) (explaining foreseeability
elements of negligence claims).

256. Id.
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abuse, the government knew about the predator and continued to
allow him to teach and be around the students. 2 7 In one case, the
government even threatened someone reporting an abuser with
slander suits. 258 In claims predicated upon physical abuse, boarding
school attendees should be able to show that the government would
or should have had notice of the abuse from the reports of the
students and also by simply observing their bruises and scars.25 9
Additionally, expert testimony may help boarding school attendees
prove that it should have been foreseeable that grossly understaffing
the schools made conditions ripe for the occurrence of physical and
sexual abuse.
The duty to protect clearly encompasses protecting children
against physical and sexual abuse. It also should encompass claims
based upon institutional neglect, such as the failure to provide
adequate medical care, food and shelter, and sanctioning severe
forms of corporal punishment, since the government, standing in
loco parentis, had a duty to provide adequate medical care, food, and
protection from harm.260 In many cases, the government not only
failed to adequately provide for the children, often the conditions at
the schools were akin to child abuse. The starving and beating of
children has been deemed socially unacceptable and harmful since
at least the late 1800s when the first society for the prevention of
cruelty to children was formed. 261 By 1962, child abuse was
nationally recognized as a serious medical concern. 262 Most states
have long-recognized that parents, teachers, or those in loco parentis
using force to punish children "must not exceed the bounds of
moderation, and must not be cruel or merciless, and that any act of
punishment in excess of such limits is unlawful. ."263 Additionally,
states have criminally prosecuted parents for failure to provide
medical care since the early 1900s and parents have been prosecuted
in some cases in which malnutrition and general neglect caused a
serious medical condition or even death. 264 Government agents'
257.
258.
259.
260.
parent

See supra text accompanying notes 153-59.
1989 SENATE REPORT, supra note 153 at 89.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
A person who stands in loco parentis voluntarily undertakes all the duties of a
such as providing for the care, maintenance, and education of a child. 50 AM.
JUR. 2D Parent& Child § 9.
261. See, e.g., Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will it Save our Children? 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 963, 964 (1998).
262. Id. at 964-65.
263. H.D. Warren, Annotation, Criminal Liabilityfor Excessive or Improper Punishment
Inflicted on Child by Parent, Teacher or One in Loco Parentis, 89 A.L.R. 2D 396, § 2 (19632005).
264. See State v. Rupp, 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Corn v. Cottam, 420 Pa.
Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992) (Third degree murder conviction upheld in death of 14-
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conduct which included failing to provide adequate medical care,
feeding the children inedible and inadequate amounts of food, and
using severe forms of corporal punishment, if engaged in by
parents, might subject the parents to criminal liability. It certainly
was in direct conflict with the government's own rules. 265 All these
facts mandate that a jury should be allowed to decide whether the
government breached its duty to protect the boarding school
attendees.
In addition to claims for various forms of physical abuse and
claims based upon institutional neglect, boarding school attendees
may have claims for severe emotional abuse. 266 As discussed in
section II, supra, many boarding school attendees have been
emotionally harmed by the schools' lack of loving care, the harsh
discipline, the military regimen, the removal from family and
culture, the institutional feel of the school, and the constant
267
degrading comments made about the children and their heritage.
There is a dearth of literature and cases dealing with breach of duty
to protect claims based solely upon emotional abuse. However, the
duty to protect should encompass both the duty to protect from
foreseeable physical and from foreseeable emotional harm. Many
states explicitly recognize the need to protect children within their
child welfare system from emotional abuse. 268 Many states also
year-old son from starvation; on death boy measured 69 inches and weighed 69 pounds,
and the parents knew of his emaciated condition and its risks but failed to obtain outside
care). See also Baruch Gitlin, Annotation, Parents' Criminal Liabilityfor Failure to Provide
Medical Attention to Their Children, 118 A.L.R. 5TH 253, § 3 (2004) (noting that it is
generally recognized that parents have duty to provide medical attention to their
children).
265. See infra, text accompanying notes 308-13, 315-19 for a description of some of the
rules governing the conduct of school administrators and employees.
266. Although the claims for severe emotional abuse are discussed in context of
claims based upon a "breach of duty to protect," they also could likely be brought as a
separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra text accompanying
notes 270-74.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 161-74 (2006).
268. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-14-1(1) (2006) (harm to a child's health or welfare can
occur through non-accidental mental injury); West's Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01(2) (2006)
("abuse means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or
sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental or
emotional health to be significantly impaired"); O.C.G.A. § 19-14-2(2) (2006) (harm
includes non-accidental mental injury); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:403(B)(3)(1972) ("Abuse
is the infliction of physical or mental injury or the causing of the deterioration of the
child and shall include exploiting or overworking a child to such an extent that his
health, moral or emotional well being is endangered"); M.C.L.A § 722.622(f) ("child
abuse means harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare that occurs through
non-accidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or
maltreatment, by a parent, a legal guardian or any other person responsible for the
child's health or welfare or by a teacher, a teacher's aide, or a member of the clergy.");
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recognize claims against nursing homes for the infliction of
emotional abuse upon nursing home residents. 269 Although breach
of duty to protect from emotional abuse is relatively uncharted
territory under the FTCA, there is a viable argument that state law
supports claims for severe emotional abuse and thus these claims
could be asserted in an FTCA negligence claim arising out of the
government's breach of duty to protect the boarding school
children.
Breach of the duty to protect from emotional abuse claims is
similar to common law claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In many states, courts require that negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims be accompanied by a physical injury or
symptom. 270 Many boarding school attendees suffer physical
manifestations of their emotional injury, such as stomach disorders,
sleeplessness and other physical symptoms suffered by victims of
PTSD271 so meeting this criterion will not be difficult. Some states,
allow claims if the plaintiff observed others being injured.272 Again,
in many boarding school claims, the children will have observed
their classmates being injured by teachers and staff. 273 Finally, in

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 22 § 4002 (abuse or neglect means a threat to the child's health
or welfare by physical mental or emotional injury or impairment by a person responsible
for a child).
269. See, e.g., Mason v. Dept. of Public Health, 326 Ill. App. 3d 616, 621-23 (2001)
(affirming finding that a nurse's aide violated the Illinois Nursing Home Act when she
subjected nursing home resident to mental abuse); see also Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16 §
1131(1)(b) (criminalizing emotional abuse on nursing home patients and describing
emotional abuse to include: cursing at, making derogatory remarks toward, ridiculing or
demeaning a patient or resident as well as threatening to inflict physical or emotional
harm on a patient). The constitutionality of the Delaware statute was affirmed in
Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356, 360 (Del. 1991) (affirming conviction of a nurse's aide
for emotionally abusing an 85-year-old nursing home resident by calling the resident
names, putting a plastic flower pot on the resident's head and lifting her dress and
shaking her buttocks at the resident).
270. See, e.g., Camper III v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440-43 (surveying cases); see also
Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement in
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distressand "Fearof Disease" Cases, 28 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1 (1992) (noting that in 1992, 37 jurisdictions required some form of physical
injury, physical impact or physical manifestation as a prerequisite to the recovery of
NIED damages).
271. See CHURCHILL, supra note 43, at 68-70 (describing physical and emotional
symptoms experienced by boarding school attendees who were traumatized by their
experience).
272. For a general collection of cases allowing what has been termed "bystander"
emotional distress cases, see Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Under Rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), or Refinements Thereof 96 A.L.R. 5TH 107 (2002).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31 (detailing some instances of boarding
school attendees forced to observe beatings and molestations of their classmates).
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some states, including those that have a physical manifestation
requirement, courts have created an exception to the physical
manifestation requirement where the facts underlying the claim
present circumstances which provide the "requisite assurance that
274
the plaintiff's psychological distress is trustworthy and genuine."
The circumstantial evidence regarding the conditions at the schools
arguably meets this test.
c.

Causation

In all negligence claims, the boarding school attendees will
have to prove causation - that the defendant's breach of duty
caused their injuries. Again, evidence of foreseeability will be
critical. The general rule is that a reasonably prudent person would
foresee that injuries of the same general type as those suffered by
the plaintiff would be likely to occur under the circumstances
existing at the time of the plaintiff's injury. 275 In addition to relying
upon government reports acknowledging the harm, boarding school
attendees would benefit from expert testimony regarding the
foreseeability of harm given the horrendous conditions at many of
276
the government-run schools.
To rebut the contention that the boarding school experience was
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional injuries, the
government will likely scour the boarding school attendees' lives,
trying to find other reasons for their emotional distress. However,
in tort cases, the alleged conduct does not have to be the sole cause
of the injury, it need only be a cause.277 Thus the assertion of
intervening causes should not prevent a jury from hearing these
claims.

274. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dept. of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 581 (Haw. 2002); see also
Marrs, supra note 270, at 1-4 (discussing the negligent infliction of emotional distress
requirements in numerous jurisdictions).
275. See generally Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741 (1970);
McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316 (1953); Cirillo v. City of
Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 2d 705 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 435 (2) (1965).

276. See, e.g., Farendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905,
909 (Minn. 1999) (finding expert affidavit stating that sexual abuse by group home
parents is a well-known hazard in the group home industry created a question of fact on
the foreseeability issue).
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (the negligent conduct must be a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm).
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Damages

The final element of a negligence claim is damages. In the
boarding school cases, damages will consist of whatever states allow
for damages in successful negligence claims, which generally will be
for past, present, and future physical and emotional suffering, lost
wages caused by the harm, and past, present, and future medical
expenses caused by the harmful conduct. 278
2.

Defenses to Boarding School Attendees' FTCA claims 279

The government will likely assert numerous defenses to FTCA
claims. The two potentially strongest defenses will be statute of
limitations and discretionary function. Both of these defenses, as
well as potential ways to avert them, are discussed in this
subsection.
a.

Statute of Limitations

The FTCA provides that, "A tort claim against the United States
shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the
appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim
accrues .".."280
A cause of action accrues under § 2401(b) when the
plaintiff "actually knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, the cause and existence of his injury." 28 1 Unlike
common law claims, there is no tolling provision in the FTCA for a
282
claimant's minority.
The two-year statute of limitations is one of the biggest hurdles
boarding school claimants must overcome in asserting FTCA claims
(and other claims as well). Virtually all of the claims arose at least
20 years ago, and many are much older than that. The boarding
school claimants will have to rely upon the few FTCA cases that
allow for tolling of the statute of limitations in situations in which
the plaintiff was unaware that the tortfeasor's abuse was a
substantial cause of her current injuries.
As a general rule, mental incompetence alone does -not permit
278. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905, 906 & 910 (1965).
279. In the FTCA claims, the government may also raise the plenary power doctrine
as grounds for the claims' dismissal. For a discussion of this governmental defense, see
part III.A.2, supra.
280. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
281. Wehrman v. United States, 830 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (8th Cir. 1987).
282. Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1980).
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the FTCA limitations period to be tolled. 283 However, in a few cases
in which the plaintiff did not recognize that her PTSD was causally
connected to the tortfeasor's conduct courts have tolled the statute
of limitations. Thus, in Simmons v. United States, 284 the plaintiff
claimed that she was severely psychologically injured when her
mental health counselor engaged in an inappropriate sexual
relationship with her. She brought her FTCA claim many years
after the relationship ended. 285 In response to the statute of
limitations argument, the court found the Simmons plaintiff's claim
arose not when she first had sexual intercourse with the counselor,
but when she was subsequently advised by a psychiatrist that her
counselor's conduct caused her PTSD. 286 The court focused on the
fact that the plaintiff was unaware of her counselor's use of the
"transference" technique 287 to engage her in a sexual relationship
and her lack of awareness of the particular harm caused by a
mishandling of the transference phenomena. 288 Thus, plaintiff's
FTCA cause of action for PTSD did not accrue until she was
diagnosed with PTSD and made aware of the connection between
her diagnosis and her previous counselor's conduct. 289
Similarly, in Toro v. United States,290 the district court found that
like Ms. Simmons, Ms. Toro had no way of knowing that her
medical misdiagnosis allegedly caused her PTSD and thus the
statute of limitations on her PTSD claim was tolled. 291 In Oslund v.
United States,292 a Vietnam Veteran who suffered from PTSD claimed
that a sexual relationship with his veteran's administration
counselor triggered a PTSD relapse. He claimed that for years he
was incapable of understanding that the counselor's conduct was a
cause of his severe PTSD relapse. 293 In Oslund, the court noted that
283. Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976); but see Oslund v.
United States, 701 F. Supp. 710, 712 (D. Minn. 1988) (suggesting that tolling may be
appropriate when the mental incompetence allegedly was caused by the government's

negligence and the incompetence limits the plaintiff's ability to understand his injury
and its cause).
284. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).

285. Id. at 1364.
286. Id. at 1366-68.
287. "Transference" is a term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a
patient's emotional reaction to a therapist and is "generally applied to the projection of
feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person

from the patient's past." Lopez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1239, 1244-45 (D.N.M.
1998) (citing Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 1473 (5th Lawyers' Ed. 1982)).

288. 805 F.2d at 1365-68.
289. Id. at 1367-68.
290. 287 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (D. Haw. 2003).

291. Id. at 1242.
292. 701 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1988).

293. Id. at 710-11.
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although the general rule is that mental incompetence alone does
not permit the FTCA statute of limitations to be tolled, when "a
plaintiff's mental incapacity is the result of the government's alleged
negligence, and the injury limits the plaintiff's capacity to
294
comprehend his injury and its cause, tolling may be appropriate."
These cases support an argument that the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until a boarding school attendee is made aware of
the cause of his or her existing injuries.
Although Simmons, Toro, and Oslund provide support for tolling
the statute of limitations in cases in which the plaintiff does not
connect her emotional and psychological injuries with the childhood
abusive experiences, other cases reach an opposite result. In at least
two cases in which plaintiffs relied on Simmons, the courts rejected
the plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations did not begin to
toll until after the plaintiffs' PTSD was diagnosed. 295 In these cases,
the plaintiff was aware that she was being abused or otherwise
harmed by the conduct while it was happening. However, she did
not realize that there was a connection between the abusive conduct
and the emotional problems suffered until her PTSD diagnosis. In
these cases, the courts viewed the plaintiffs' PTSD as yet another
ramification or consequence of the original abuse or harmful
conduct, and held that the statute of limitations began to run at the
296
time of the harmful conduct.
Based on existing law, boarding school attendees have two
potentially viable arguments to avert a statute of limitations
dismissal. First, they may argue that, like the plaintiffs in the
Simmons line of cases, they had no idea that they were being harmed
at the time the harm occurred. Young children likely would not be
aware of the psychological harm they were incurring when the
boarding school staff repeatedly denigrated them, their parents,
their culture, and their heritage. They would not know that
subjecting them to years of institutionalization and living conditions
in which they were deprived of love and care, and emotional
support was wrongful conduct on the part of their caregivers. Thus,
it is likely that these children, many of whom suffer from PTSD, had
no idea that the cause of their injury was their years spent in the
schools. Boarding school attendees who are diagnosed with PTSD
and who are told their school attendance caused their condition are
294. Id. at 712.
295. Shirley v. United States, 832 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (D. Minn. 1993); Lopez v. United
States, 998 F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (D.N.M. 1998); see also K.E.S. v. United States, 38 F.3d
1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 1994) (court will not toll the statute of limitations because the
plaintiff was aware the tortfeasor's conduct was wrong at the time the conduct
occurred).
296. See Lopez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 1239, 1242-44 (D.N.M. 1998).
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much more akin to the plaintiffs in the Simmons line of cases than to
the plaintiffs in the cases in which courts did not allow tolling of the
statute of limitations.
A related theory for tolling the statute of limitations is that the
plaintiff repressed the memory of the horrific events and until that
memory was revived, she did not realize that she had been harmed
by what occurred in the boarding schools. This theory has been
used with varying degrees of success by sexual abuse plaintiffs in
state cases; in most instances it is only successful if the plaintiff can
genuinely prove repressed memories. 297
An innovative theory for tolling the statute of limitations in the
boarding school cases hinges on whether experts can determine
whether the transference phenomenon occurred between boarding
school attendees and their caregivers. The transference phenomena
have been used successfully to avert a statute of limitations defense
in cases of therapist sexual misconduct with patients. 298 Patients
often transfer feelings they had about their parents on to their
therapists. 299 Some therapists have taken advantage of this and have
297. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Emotional or Psychological "Blocking" or
Repression as Tolling Running of Statute of Limitations, 11 A.L.R. 5TH 588 (1993) (compiling
cases in which plaintiffs have claimed repressed memories as a reason to toll the statute
of limitations); see also Annotation, Post Traumatic Syndrome, supra note 227 (discussing
when PTSD may result in tolling of the statute of limitations); but see supra text
accompanying note 283 (noting general rule that the FTCA does not allow tolling for
mental disability or incompetence).
298. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
for purposes of the statute of limitations, patient's cause of action arising out of her
counselor's sexual misconduct did not accrue until she knew that her counselor's
improper handling of the transference phenomenon had caused the emotional and
psychological damage from which she suffered); Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F.Supp. 765
(D.C. Pa. 1978) (showing that the plaintiff's extreme dependence on defendant
psychiatrist, caused by his mishandling of the transference phenomenon, prevented her
from knowing that she had been injured by the defendant until after the limitations
period had run); Coopersmith v. Gold, 172 A.D.2d 982, 984 (N.Y. A.D. 1991), remanded
156 Misc.2d 594, 594 N.Y.S.2d 521 (demonstrating that the long delay between the
plaintiff's accrual of her cause of action for malpractice arising out of sexual misconduct
and the institution of the legal proceeding was the result of the defendant psychiatrist's
use of the transference phenomenon); McNall v. Summers, 25 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1314, 30
Cal.Rptr. 2d 914, 925 (1994) (stating claim for sexual abuse medical malpractice against
her psychiatrist by presenting evidence that he had improperly used transference
therapy in order to engage her in sexual intercourse).
299. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (including expert
medical witness testimony explaining how the transference phenomenon symbolizes the
parent-child relationship); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis.2d 455, 461, 362
N.W.2d 174, 177 (1984) (explaining how the patient unconsciously attributes to the
psychiatrist or analyst those feelings which he may have repressed towards his own
parents); Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 643, 611 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Neb. 2000)
(describing transference as "the process whereby a patient displaces on to the therapist
feelings, attitudes and attributes which properly belong to a significant attachment
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used the patient's transference of feelings to take advantage of the
patients and have sex with them. Patients often do not realize until
long past the statute of limitations, that the abuse of the transference
phenomena was a cause of their emotional distress.300 Courts have
recognized the abuse of the transference phenomena as a reason to
toll the statute of limitations. 301
An untested but interesting response to a statute of limitations
defense would be to see if the transference phenomena applied in
the boarding school cases. In these cases, the children had no
parental figures other than their teachers, school counselors, and
dormitory aides. It is possible that some boarding school attendees,
because of transferring the feelings they had for their parents onto
the adults in the boarding schools, did not connect their later
emotional distress to the actions of the adults who molested or
otherwise abused them while they were in boarding schools. As
one court noted, the dependency existing in the teacher-student
relationship is analogous to the dependency existing in the
therapist-patient relationship on account of the transference
phenomenon. 3 2 How transference works in these boarding school
settings certainly is something to explore with psychological experts
since it may be another way to avert a statute of limitations defense.
b.

Discretionary Function Defense

Boarding school attendees bringing FTCA claims should
anticipate a "discretionary function" defense. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
provides that the United States is not liable for any claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." 30 3 A discretionary function analysis
first requires determining whether a "statute, regulation, or rule
figure of the past, usually a parent, and responds to the therapist accordingly"). See also
C. Katherine Mann with John D. Winer, Medical Negligence - Psychotherapist's Sexual
Contact With Client, 14 Am. Jur. 3d PROOF OF FACTS § 319 (2005) (discussing transference
and countertransference in psychotherapeutic relationships).
300. See supra note 298 (citing cases in which plaintiffs missed the statute of
limitations due to ignorance about their therapists' misuse of the transference
phenomenon).
301. Id.
302. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d 344, 353 (citing dissenting opinion
by Justice Moore) (Ala. 1990) (finding no vicarious liability for therapist's mishandling of
transference phenomena, relying on the analysis in a school sexual molestation case,
John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (1989)).
303. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
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specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow." 3 4 If there is a mandatory prescribed course of action which
the employee fails to follow, the discretionary function exception is
inapplicable because no discretion is involved. 3 5 If it does not
involve the violation of a mandatory statute, regulation or rule,
courts must then determine if the conduct is the kind of policy
judgment Congress intended to protect when it enacted the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.306
There are two ways to avoid the discretionary function defense.
The first, and simplest way, is to point to specific regulations or
policies that school administrators violated. If there were clear rules
governing particular conduct, no discretion was involved in that
conduct. 30 7 It is possible that, in some cases, plaintiffs could use a
violation of existing rules as a way to avert the application of a
discretionary function defense. For example, in 1892, the BIA
published Rules for Indian Boarding Schools.308 The Rules forbade
employees from having children in their rooms 309 and required
periodic checks of the school building to watch over the conduct of
pupils and others. 310 The Rules also specifically required healthy,
well-cooked food, including ample vegetables, fruits, milk, butter,
and cheese. 311 Buildings were to be kept in thorough repair with
specific mandates on what must be done. 312 Corporal punishment
was allowed only for grave violations and only under the direction
of the superintendent. In no case were the children to be subjected
to unusual, cruel, or degrading punishments. 313 Likewise, 25 CFR
84.44-84.55 (1938), had specific requirements regarding discovery
and treatment of TB and other infections diseases as well as
requirements for monitoring the physical health of boarding school
students. A 1941 Manual for Indian School Service, published
under John Collier, a reformer who unsuccessfully attempted to
change the culture and direction of Indian education, 314 specifically
304. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1998); see also United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
305. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.

306. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; Gaubert,499 U.S. at 322-23.
307. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.
308. Office of Indian Affairs, RULES FOR INDIAN SCHOOLS WITH COURSE OF STUDY,

LIST OF TEXTBOOKS AND CIVIL SERVICE RULES, Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1892,
available at http://content.wisconsinhistory.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2006) (also on file

with author).
309. Id. at Rule 193.
310. Id. at Rule 238
311. Id. at Rule 101.
312. Id. at Rules 100, 169-88.
313. Id. at Rules 115, 116.

314. For information about Collier, his proposed reform, and the very limited success

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

instructed staff that they should not forbid or prohibit students from
using their native languages 315 and prohibited corporal
punishment. 3 6 It also contained specific rules regarding minimum
housing and health and safety standards, 317 put limits on the type
and amount of work students should be required to do,318 and set
forth mandatory minimum standards for medical care and
treatment. 3 9 If these or similar rules were in effect at the time of the
plaintiff's injury, and if a violation of these rules was a cause of the
plaintiff's injury, the discretionary function exception is
inapplicable.
The second way to avoid the discretionary function defense is
for those situations in which there was not a clear violation of
existing rules and regulations. If no rules, regulations, or statutes
were violated, the courts must then decide whether the action is of
the type Congress meant to protect - i.e., whether it involves a
decision susceptible to social, economic, or political policy analysis.
To determine if the discretionary function defense applies, courts
look at whether the government's decisions are based upon the
exercise of social, economic, or political policy.320 The point of this
exception is to make sure government agencies and employees are
free to make policy-related decisions that their jobs require, without
fear that they or the government may be sued whenever someone
thinks they have decided badly. 321 Exactly what constitutes the
exercise of social, economic, or political policy is an open question.
A 1995 survey of cases found that, in the majority of cases, the
government was successful with the discretionary function defense,
often just by claiming budgetary considerations could have been a
factor in the decision. 322 However, at least one circuit has refused to
allow the government to "use the mere presence of budgetary
concerns to shield allegedly negligent conduct from suit under the
FTCA" because "[t]o hold otherwise allows the discretionary
function exception to all but swallow the Federal Tort Claims
Act." 323
of those reforms, see generally SZASZ, supra note 38.
315. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPT. OF INTERIOR, MANUAL FOR THE INDIAN SCHOOL

SERVICE 21 (1942) (also on file with author).
316. Id. at 58.
317. Id. at 72-80.

318. Id. at 75.
319. Id. at 60-72.
320. Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Dykstra v. United States Bureau
of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 1998).
321. Claude v. Smola, 263 F.3d 858,860 (8th Cir. 2001).
322. Donald N. Zillman, ProtectingDiscretion: Judicial Interpretationof the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365, 384 (1995).
323. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005).

Fall 20061

CIVIL CLAIMS FOR UNCIVILIZED ACTS

It will be more difficult to overcome the discretionary function
defense if there was not a direct violation of existing rules and the
courts hearing these claims must decide whether the claims involve
decisions susceptible to social, economic, or policy analysis. For
example, to the extent a claim for breach of the duty to protect is
based upon the emotional abuse suffered by the children because of
the schools' attempted destruction of American Indian culture, the
claim may be dismissed under the discretionary function exception.
The government, for virtually all of the years the boarding schools
existed, saw the schools as a tool to advance policies of assimilation
and termination of American Indian tribes and culture. 324 This was
a policy decision, albeit a genocidal one. Thus, the government may
be protected from FTCA claims based upon its decision to obliterate
American Indian culture and try to make American Indians into
"white men."
However, to the extent the breach of duty to protect was based
upon failure to protect the children from physical and sexual abuse,
or failure to protect the children from the emotional abuse caused by
degrading comments, abusive punishments and institutional
neglect, boarding school attendees have an argument that that was
not the kind of conduct the discretionary function exception was
designed to protect. The purpose of the discretionary function
exception is to allow government agencies to make policy decisions
without fear of being sued for bad decisions, 325 not to shield the
government from liability when it abdicates its responsibility to the
young children in its care. When the government takes innocent
children into its custody, it cannot simply claim that, as a matter of
policy, it has the right to place children in harm's way, especially
when Congress's own special committees have condemned the
conduct. 326 In Whisnant v. United States, 327 the Ninth Circuit noted
that "[w]hile the government has discretion to decide how to carry
out its responsibility to maintain safe and healthy premises, it does
not have discretion to abdicate its responsibility in this regard.
When it does so, the discretionary function exception cannot shield
328
the government from FTCA liability for its negligent conduct."
As the Eighth Circuit noted in Tonelli v. United States,329 "[f]ailure to
act after notice of illegal action does not represent a choice based
324. See supra text accompanying notes 23-42 (discussing government's assimilationist
policies).
325. Claude, 263 F.3d at 860.
326. See generally 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59; 1989 SENATE REPORT, supra note
153; MERIAM REPORT, supra note 91.

327. 400 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005).
328. Id. at 1185.
329. 60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 1995).
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upon plausible policy considerations." 330 Physically and sexually
assaulting children is incontrovertibly illegal. Starving children,
failing to get them necessary medical care and forcing them to work
in violation of child labor laws also violates the law. 331 Severely
degrading, humiliating, and otherwise emotionally abusing children
constitutes child abuse in some states. 332 Thus, some of the
government's conduct, if done by individuals, would be illegal
and/or would be child abuse. The government should not be
allowed to successfully argue that allowing children to live in
unsafe accommodations, without adequate nutrition and medical
care, and subjecting them to physical, emotional, and sexual abuse
represent a choice based upon plausible policy considerations.
In sum, boarding school attendees' best hope in avoiding
application of the discretionary function exception is to discover
specific rules, policies, and regulations which were violated and in
which the violations were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.
The discretionary function exception may apply to
emotional abuse claims insofar as those claims are based upon
assimilationist policies. However, physical and emotional abuse
claims based upon other factors such as lack of adequate food,
housing, medical care, an emotionally abusive environment, and
physical and sexual abuse should survive a discretionary function
defense challenge because ignoring the dangerous situations it
created for innocent young children is not the kind of governmental
conduct the discretionary function was designed to protect.
C. International Law Claims
Since World War II and the establishment of the United
Nations, the international community has acknowledged that states
have fundamental obligations under international law, not only to
330. Id. at 496.
331. See generally supra note 264, Gitlin, Annotation, (collecting cases in which parents
have been found criminally liable for failing to provide proper medical care and
treatment to their children); John D. Perovich, Annotation, Homicide by Withholding Food,
Clothing and Shelter, 61 A.L.R. 3D 1207 (1975-2004) (collecting cases involving
prosecutions for homicide based solely or primarily on a criminal omission to provide
food, clothing, or shelter to one in a dependent relationship toward the accused, such as
a child to a parent); see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 212 (prohibiting employers from engaging in
oppressive child labor practices).
332. See supra note 268 (identifying states in which emotional abuse may be child
abuse); see also Comment, Karolyn A. Hicks, "Reparative" Therapy: Whether Parental
Attempts to Change a Child's Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM.
U. L. REV. 505, 519 n.62 (1999) (listing numerous states that include mental or emotional
injury in their statutory definition of child abuse).
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other states, but to the individuals and groups under their
jurisdiction. Thus, in addition to more traditional domestic law
claims, boarding school attendees have at least three potential
claims based upon international law. Because international law
addresses the sorts of abuses discussed in this article with more
specificity than domestic statutes, it provides alternative grounds
for relief and remedies. As the Supreme Court has long-recognized,
international law is an integral part of U.S. law, 333 and the right to a
remedy for human rights abuses is a basic tenet of international as
well as domestic law. 334 While U.S. courts are often reluctant to
expressly invoke international law, it is important to raise such
claims because if boarding school attendees want to pursue the
international law claims in international courts, they generally
should first exhaust all their domestic law remedies. 335 To the extent
that international law serves as a basis for remedies in domestic
courts, the international law claims should be incorporated into the
complaint in order to be preserved for adjudication in international
forums. Additionally, raising international human rights law claims
in federal courts helps "strengthen our judiciary's understanding

333. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that international law is
part of U.S. law that is to be administered and determined by U.S. courts); see also Jordan
J. Paust, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3-16 (2d ed. 2003) (citing

numerous authorities as evidence of the incorporation of international law into domestic
law).
334. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 8, states: "everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, GA. Res. 217 A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 2, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; see also Beth
Stephens and Michael Ratner, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.

COURTS 2 (1996) (noting that beginning in 1976, U.S. courts have begun to recognize "an
emerging international law concept of the right to a remedy which holds that all victims
of human rights abuses have a right both to receive compensation for their injuries and
to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes.").
335. The American Convention on Human Rights, Article 46(1)(a) states that a
requirement of admission of a petition or communication is that "the remedies under
domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally
recognized principles of international law." THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, Jul. 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; see also EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Nov. 4, 1950, 312

U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55
and Protocol No. 8 E.T.S. 118, Article 26 ("The Commission may only deal with the
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognized rules of international law...."). See also, Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 733 n.21 (noting that the European Commission argues as amicus that international
law requires exhaustion of domestic remedies before asserting a claim in a foreign
forum).
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and tolerance of international law norms." 336 It also provides
human rights abuse plaintiffs, such as boarding school attendees,
with viable and alternative grounds for relief.
Although claims predicated upon violations of international
law may seem intimidating because most lawyers and judges are
unfamiliar with international law, 337 the claims are not that much
more complicated than claims based upon other sources of domestic
law, such as the FTCA, or the Tucker Act. International law, like
statutes and the common law, is simply another potential avenue of
redress.
Customary international law has long been recognized as an
integral part of U.S. law. In 1900, the Supreme Court in the Paquete
Habanastated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations;
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.338
The principles articulated in the Paquete Habana remain
controlling law today. 339 Thus human rights abuse victims may look
336. Stephens & Ratner, supra note 334, at 235.
337. See generally Paul L. Hoffman, "The Blank State Phenomenon:" Proving Customary
InternationalLaw in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 181 (1995-1996) (discussing the
problem of proving the basic legitimacy of customary international law to skeptical
judges and the frequent judicial response to evidence of customary international law the "blank stare").
338. 175 U.S. at 700 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15). See generally
PAUST, supra note 333 (providing excellent and extensive authority in support of the
view that international law is part of U.S. law).
339. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing
international law as part of the law of the United States and noting that courts must
determine customary international law in the manner set out in the Paquete Habana); In
re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir.
1992) ("It is ...well settled that the law of nations is part of federal common law."). This
view has been critiqued by a few academics. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary international law should
not be treated as federal common law). Professors Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge
that they are in a minority and cite to numerous scholars and courts who have stated
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to customary international law as another basis of potential redress
for claims filed in domestic courts.340
Customary international law is the "human law 'established by
the general consent of mankind.' ' 341 To establish that a certain
precept or rule is a rule of customary law, lawyers draw upon
numerous sources including "international agreements, domestic
court decisions, the practice of governments and the opinions of
international law scholars." 342 Customary international law, similar
to international law defined by treaties and other agreements, rests
upon the consent of states. 343 A state that persistently objects to a
norm of customary international law that other states accept is not
bound by that norm. However, fundamental and universal norms
that constitute jus cogens transcend such consent 344 and states cannot
exempt themselves from laws that are jus cogens. Thus, if a law is jus
cogens, states are bound by it regardless of their consent.
In filing customary international law claims in federal court,
boarding school attendees must state the court's jurisdictional basis
for hearing these claims. Over the last 25 years, some federal courts
have reasoned that since international law is part of federal common
law, and since 18 U.S.C. § 1331 grants jurisdiction for all claims
"arising under the laws of the United States" 345 international human
rights claimants may use § 1331 as a basis for federal court
jurisdiction. 346 A few courts, arguing that international law is not
that customary international law is part of federal common law. See id. at 817.
340. Treaty violations may also serve as the basis for domestic law claims because the
United States Constitution states that treaties are part of the "supreme Law of the Land".
U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2. However, if the treaty is non-self-executing it "cannot operate
directly as domestic law to create a cause of action or for prosecution without
implementing legislation (such as the ATCA for civil sanctions) or some other law or
legal act .... " PAUST, supra note 333 at 78. Professor Paust provides a thorough and
excellent discussion of how the law on self-executing treaties has developed, its current
status, and its implications for domestic claims based upon treaty violations. Id. at 67-98.
341. PAUST, supra note 333 at 3 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796)).
342. Stephens & Ratner, supra note 334 at 54 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 152 (1820); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103(2) (1987)).

343. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F. 2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
344. Id.
345. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
346. Cases recognizing federal court jurisdiction is available under 28 U.S. C. § 1331
for claims based upon violations of customary international law include: Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing international law as part of
the law of the United States and that the court could have taken jurisdiction under 28
U.S. C. § 1331 but ultimately conferring jurisdiction for Alien Tort Claims Act case under
28 U.S.C. § 1350); accord Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
overruled in part on other grounds, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988), (noting that both §
1331 and § 1350 provided jurisdiction for violation of customary international law
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itself a source of private rights of action, have found that
international law claims for violations of human rights cannot arise
under federal common law and thus § 1331 does not provide a
jurisdictional basis for these claims. 347
The question of whether § 1331 gives federal courts the power
to hear claims based upon customary international law has yet to be
answered by the Supreme Court.348 However, if the boarding school
attendees' cases do reach the Supreme Court on the jurisdictional
question, it certainly would be ironic for the Court to have held that
aliens, under the Alien Tort Statute, may file customary
international law claims for human rights abuses in our federal
courts while our own citizens lack a jurisdictional basis for these
same claims. This irony is compounded by the fact that many
American Indians had United States citizenship forced upon
them. 349
Assuming boarding school attendees can get federal court
jurisdiction under § 1331, they may allege that the United States
knowingly and intentionally submitted generations of AmericanIndian children to treatment so brutal and living conditions so
inadequate and inhumane that it led to thousands of deaths and
untold physical and psychological damage for generations of
American Indians. As will be explained below, this intentional
neglect and maltreatment, motivated by a desire to eradicate the
children's American Indian ethnicity and heritage, violated
customary international laws against genocide, laws prohibiting
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, as well as
prohibitions against torture); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (not
addressing jurisdiction under § 1331 but confirming jurisdiction under § 1350). For an
excellent discussion of jurisdictional issues under § 1331, see Stephens and Ratner, supra
note 334, at 31-36.
347. This is the argument laid out by the concurrences of Judges Edwards and Bork in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 n. 4 (C.A. D.C. 1984) (Edwards J.
concurring); Id. at 811 (Bork, J.concurring); see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,
193-94 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting in dicta that § 1331 may not provide a jurisdictional basis
for customary international law claims); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp.1421, 1426-28
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding no jurisdiction under § 1331). For an excellent critique of the
Tel-Oren arguments that § 1331 does not provide a jurisdictional basis for customary
international law claims, see PAUST, supra note 333, at 229-36 (discussing the § 1331
jurisdictional arguments in a subsection entitled "Deviant Opinions in Tel-Oren").
348. Recently, in dictum, the Supreme Court has noted that although federal courts
have jurisdiction to hear customary international law claims under the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, federal courts' jurisdiction to hear customary international law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 remains an open question. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.
349. For a discussion of how citizenship was forced upon American Indians, see
Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:
Redress the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV.
BLACKLETrER L.J. 107 (1999).
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laws protecting the fundamental rights of children.
1.

Genocide Claims

This section describes the historical basis underlying the United
States' recognition that genocide is jus cogens. It also explains how
the international community defines genocide as going beyond
mass killing to encompass conduct that is designed to destroy a
people "as such." The section argues that boarding school survivors
have potentially viable genocide claims and it discusses ways to
conceptualize those claims.

a.

Genocide Claims as Jus Cogens

Customary international law has long prohibited genocide,
although the term itself was not coined until the 1940s.350 For
evidence of this, one need only look at the post-World War II
Nuremberg Trials. 351 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Siderman de
Backe:
The legitimacy of the Nuremberg prosecutions rested not on the
consent of the Axis Powers and individual defendants, but on the
nature of the acts they committed: acts that the laws of all
civilized nations define as criminal. (citation omitted). The
universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by
Nuremberg -rights against genocide, enslavement, and other
inhumane acts, (citation omitted) -are the direct ancestors of the
universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens. In the
350. See CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 363 (discussing how Dr. Raphael Lemkin, an
exiled Polish-Jewish jurist coined the term genocide in the 1940s).
351. That customary international law prohibited genocide long before World War II
was a position strongly advocated by the United States during the Nuremberg Trials in
response to the Nazis' arguments that they were being tried under ex postfacto laws. For

an analysis of the United States' position during the Nuremberg Trials that customary
international law prohibitions against genocide could be used to hold the Nazis
accountable, see Henry L. Stimson, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL, LANDMARK IN LAW, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. XXV at 179-89, Jan. 1947. See also UN WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF
WAR (1948); INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 42, Vols. (Blue Series), Nuremberg
1949, V. 1 168-70, 458-94 (for the German arguments that they were being prosecuted

under ex postfacto laws).

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

words of the International Court of Justice, these norms, which
include "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person," are the concern of all states; "they are obligations
erga omnes. "352
Most people conceptualize genocide as the mass killing of a
particular ethnic or religious group, but genocide, as defined under
international law, applies to conduct beyond mass murder. 353 The
original draft of the United Nations Convention against Genocide
focused not only on mass killing, but upon actions and policies that
brought about the "'planned disintegration of the political, social or
economic structure of a group or nation' and/or the 'systematic
moral debasement of a group or people or nation.' ' 354 Although,
due to intense lobbying by the United States, 355 the final draft of the
1948 Convention on Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of
Genocide did not include this definition, it did encompass much
more than mass killing.
Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. killing members of the group;
b. causing serious bodily injury or mental harm to members of the
group;
c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
35 6
e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;
In the boarding school cases, it is important to recognize that
Art. II of the UN's 1948 Convention on Punishment and Prevention

352. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715.
353. See notes infra text and accompanying note 356 (setting out the text of the
Convention Against Genocide).
354. CHURCHILL, GENOCIDE, supra note 7, at 365 (quoting ROBERT DAVIS AND MARK
ZANNIS, THE GENOCIDE MACHINE IN CANADA: THE PACIFICATION OF THE NORTH 19

(1973)).
355. Id. at 364-68 (describing the United States' and other countries' lobbying efforts
which successfully eliminated the section of the draft document which included cultural
as well as physical and biological genocide).
356. G.A. RES. 260(A) (III), U.N. GAOR, 3D SESS. (DEC. 9, 1948) (hereinafter Genocide
Convention). Under Article III, the Convention makes the following acts punishable: a.

genocide; b. conspiracy to commit genocide; c. direct and public incitement to commit
genocide; d. attempt to commit genocide; and e. complicity in genocide. Id.
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of the Crime of Genocide prohibits conduct intended "to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
Such."

357

Although most nations quickly ratified the Genocide
Convention, the United States, fearful of how the Convention might
be used to punish it for its conduct both against American Indians
and against African Americans, refused to ratify the United Nations
Convention for almost 40 years.358 When it finally ratified the
Convention in 1988, it did so with numerous "reservations" and an
"understanding" which "sought to redefine genocide in a manner
substantially at odds with the Convention and thus also at odds
with customary jus cogens." 359 In fact, one of the reservations was
that the Convention could not be "construed as creating any
substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
any proceeding." 360 However, as Professor Paust notes, the attempt
to limit the terms and applicability of the Convention is at odds with
the treaty's purpose and thus is legally unacceptable 361 and the
United States' attempt to re-define genocide "has been obviated by
the development of a customary international law independent of a
long, abnegative effort of the Senate to allow the United States to
362
participate in the treaty process."
Given the belated ratification of the Genocide Convention, and
the myriad of reservations, the Convention cannot be used to
support a claim based directly upon violation of an international
treaty. 363 However, the Genocide Convention provides very strong
evidence of customary international law prohibitions against
genocidal conduct, conduct which is considered jus cogens - i.e., a
violation of international law from which nations cannot exempt
themselves. 364 Although the Genocide Convention itself deals with
357. Id. at Art. 2 (emphasis added).
358. CHURCHILL, supra note 7, at 363-87 (describing the United States' ratification
process).

359. FAUST, supra note 333, at 395.
360. 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (2000).
361. PAUST, supra note 333, at 395. This view is supported by Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention which states that a state cannot invoke its domestic law to avoid compliance
with international law. See Vienna Convention, 52 Fed. Register 6262-302 (March 2,

1987).
362. PAUST, supra note 333, at 395. For an in-depth discussion and well-documented
argument as to why the United States' ratification process does not negate its obligations
to comport with the Genocide Convention as it is written, see id. at 395-400.
363. See note supra, note 340 (discussing how, in some instances, a direct violation of
an international treaty may serve as the basis of a domestic law claim).
364. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717 (noting that genocide is jus cogens) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987));

accord, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding genocide is prohibited
by international law); see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts
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the criminality of genocide, the recognition that genocide is jus
cogens has served as the basis for tort claims brought under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.365 Having been applied in civil law ATCA
claims, it would be difficult to now argue its use is constricted only
to criminal law actions. Thus, the Genocide Convention is strong
evidence of customary international law and may be used as the
basis for a genocide claim brought by boarding school attendees.
b.

The United States' Genocidal Conduct

In section I, supra, this article discusses the historical treatment
of American Indians to provide context for understanding the
development and perpetuation of American Indian boarding
schools. In section II, the article discusses the schools' goal of
"killing the Indian to save the man" and describes, in detail, the
method used to achieve that goal. This section of the article briefly
discusses how the facts set out in sections I and II can be used to
support a genocide claim by boarding school attendees against the
366
United States.
To prevail in a genocide claim, boarding school attendees do
not have to prove that the government intended to eliminate all
American Indians with its boarding school policies. Instead, using
the Genocide Convention as strong evidence of jus cogens
international law, they need only prove that the government
engaged in conduct intended to eliminate American Indians "as
such" and that it engaged in one or more of the five categories of
Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1138 (noting jus cogens
norms prohibit genocide).
365. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the Alien Tort Claims
Act provides a basis for claims alleging genocide). The Alien Tort Claims Act [ATCA]
applies to tort suits filed by aliens, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Since the United States declared
that American Indians are United States citizens, the ATCA does not apply to cases
brought by American Indians against the United States government. However, ATCA
genocide and torture cases are helpful analogies in the boarding school international law
claims.
366. The Truth Commission into Genocide in Canada wrote a lengthy article that lays
out facts that support each element of a genocide claim in boarding school cases. Hidden
from History: The Canadian Holocaust, the Untold Story of the Genocide of Aboriginal Peoples
by Church and State, available at http://Canadiangenocide.nativeweb.org/genocide.pdf
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006). As Professor Churchill notes, the Canadian and United
States' governments acted in a very similar manner with regard to American Indian
boarding schools. See generally CHURCHILL, supra note 48 (discussing both the Canadian
and United States' philosophies and actions with regard to the boarding schools). Given
the similarities between the two countries' actions, the Truth Commission's work
provides an excellent framework for those seeking to bring a genocide claim against the
United States.
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activities that are considered criminal genocidal acts when directed
367
against an identified "national, ethnical, racial or religious group."
First, boarding school attendees must prove the specific intent
of the United States government to destroy the American Indian
peoples as such. Evidence of specific intent to destroy the American
Indian peoples as such can be found in the historical treatment of
American Indians including governmental acts such as the
massacres and other forms of killing justified as part of "Manifest
Destiny," 368 and the forced sterilization of American-Indian
women,369 as well as the forced removal of American-Indian
children from their families with the aim of destroying their
"Indianness." 370 Thus, any genocide claim must not only look at
what was done at the boarding schools, but it must be
contextualized in accordance with this nation's historical treatment
of American Indians.
To support the contention that the government intended to
eliminate American Indians "as such" attendees could point
specifically to the stated purpose of the American Indian boarding
371
school system which was to: "kill the Indian and save the man."
A clearer statement of a desire to wipe out an ethnic or racial group
367. Genocide Convention, supra text accompanying note 357.
368. See CHURCHILL, supra note 7 at 219 (noting that "As pronouncements of
Angloamerica's "Manifest Destiny" to enjoy limitless expansion intensified, so too did
calls for the outright eradication of Indians, or at least large numbers of them, wherever
they might be encountered."); see also HORSMAN, supra note 16, at 207 (1981) (noting that
"[b]y 1850, the American public ... now believed that American Indians were doomed
because of their own inferiority and that their extinction would further world
progress").
369. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Women and Aids - Racism, Sexism and Classism, 17
N.Y.U. L. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 351, 361-62 (1989-90) (reporting that more that 25% of
American-Indian women are sterilized and in one year, at one federal Indian hospital in
Oklahoma, 132 women were sterilized). For a discussion of the forced sterilization of
American-Indian women, see Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudenceof Rape, 14
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 133 n.129 (2004) (citing numerous articles dealing with the
forced sterilization of American-Indian women).
370. For in-depth analysis of this country's genocidal policies with regard to
American Indians, see generally CHURCHILL, supra note 7; see also Lindsey Glauner, The
Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976, The United States Government'sRole in the
Promotion, Implementation and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans,
51 DE PAUL L. REV. 911 (2002).
371. CHURCHILL, supra note 48, at 13-14 (noting that this quote from Captain Pratt in
1895 was slightly rephrased by Indian Commissioner Jones in 1903 who said he wanted
to "exterminate the Indian but develop the man." With the exception of a brief period in
the 1930s and early 1940s, the attempt to "kill the Indian to save the man" remained a
tenet of the boarding schools into the 1960s. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52
(describing the general philosophy that was reported by the 1969 Senate Committee
investigating American Indian Boarding schools) and see infra text accompanying note
381 (describing Collier's failed efforts at reforms in the 1930s-40s).
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as such could not be had. It is from this premise that all other
actions flowed.
Using the Genocide Convention as a framework for their
genocide claim, 372 attendees have viable arguments that the
government's actions violated three separate sections of the
Convention's prohibitions: 1. causing serious bodily injury or
mental harm to members of the group; 2. deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; and 3. forcibly transferring children
373
of the group to another group.
As set forth in great detail in section II, the boarding schools
caused serious bodily injury and mental harm to generations of
American Indians. Thus, a genocide claim based upon conduct
causing "serious bodily harm" and conduct that "deliberately
inflicted on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about the
group's physical destruction" can be supported using the facts set
out in sections I and II as well as facts supplied by individual
plaintiffs. As for the claim of forcible transfer of children from one
group to another, that, too, can be supported by the facts. Through
economic coercion, 374 including failure to provide for on-reservation
schools, 375 children were forced to attend the boarding schools.
Once there, the schools attempted to separate the children from their
people through the psychological tactics including forbidding the
children from speaking their languages 376 or practicing their
religions 377 and otherwise denigrating the children's families and
cultures. 378 The children were instructed to reject their cultures and

372. As discussed in supra text accompanying notes 363-65, although the Genocide
Convention cannot be used to prove a violation of a treaty per se, it is strong evidence of
customary international law and the framework for claims based upon the violation of
the jus cogens prohibition against genocide.

373. In proving these elements, plaintiffs will also be supporting their claim that the
government's actions were done with the intent to destroy the American Indian people
as such since the conduct involved in proving these elements would predictably
eliminate the American Indian peoples "as such."
374. See supra text accompanying notes 4648, 57-58.
375. See supra text accompanying note 59, (discussing the government's failure to

comply with treaty obligations to provide on-reservation schools and noting that as late
as 1967, 83% of Navajo children were in boarding schools because the government
claimed it was too expensive to build schools near the children's homes).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78 (describing the schools' prohibition
against speaking native languages and how this led children to become disconnected
from their heritage).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82 (describing the prohibition on practicing

native religions).
378. See generally supra Part II.B. (describing the elevation of white culture and the
denigration of all things Indian).
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instead, to adopt "superior" white Christian values and culture. 379
Additionally, the children were deliberately separated from their
parents and families and not allowed to return home. 380 Although
there was a brief period in the 1930s and early 1940s, during which
John Collier attempted to change the boarding school system so that
American Indian culture, while not elevated to the same level as
white culture, was at least somewhat incorporated into the school
curriculum, 381 these reform efforts failed. By the start of WWII,the
schools returned to the earlier philosophy in which the children
were instructed to reject their entire heritage and embrace the
heritage and values of the dominant white culture.382 This conduct
provides a basis for arguing that the facts support a claim based
upon the forcible transfer of children of one group to another group.
The government is unlikely to contest the premise that genocide
is prohibited by international law.383 It will, however, contend that
its conduct was not genocidal but instead, it was a benevolent, if
misguided, attempt to improve the conditions of American Indians.
The government will portray the schools as an attempt to help
American Indians, not destroy them. However, given: 1. the history
of the government's general treatment of American Indians; 2. the
boarding schools' stated purpose of stripping children of their
American Indian culture and instilling white Christian values; 3. the
schools' known horrible living conditions which resulted in severe
illness and death; and 4. the known inter-generational and
psychological problems caused by the schools- problems that led to
the further death and destruction of the American Indian peoples,
whether the government's conduct constituted genocide should be a
question of fact.
2.

Torture, Cruel and Inhuman and DegradingTreatment Claims
The treatment of American-Indian children in boarding schools

379. Id.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90 (describing the separation and the
hunting down of "AWOL" students that occurred even as late as the 1960s).
381. See generally SZASZ, supra note 38 (describing Collier's attempted reforms and the
demise of his efforts to integrate American Indian culture into the boarding school
curriculum).
382. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 33-34 (describing how, even in the 1960s,
schools were geared toward making the children "Non-Indian" and getting them to
adopt the "superior" white culture).
383. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (noting "[iun the aftermath of the atrocities
committed during the Second World War, the condemnation of genocide as contrary to
international law quickly achieved broad acceptance by the community of nations").
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systematically violated international law norms which prohibit
torture and cruel and inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment. That torture and cruel and inhuman treatment is a
violation of customary international law has been clearly
established.
In Filitarga v. Pena-Arala384 the Second Circuit
concluded that "the right to be free from torture" is a fundamental
right recognized by customary international law.385 The United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a
document that has come to be viewed as "an authoritative listing of
human rights" and thus "a basic component of international
customary law, binding on all states" 386 states that "no one shall be
subjected to torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment." 387 This prohibition against torture, cruel or inhuman
or degrading treatment is seen in numerous other international law
documents, including the American Convention on Human
Rights, 388 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 389
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 390
Like the prohibition against
genocide, the prohibition against torture is jus cogens-a
fundamental international law norm that cannot be overridden by
domestic authority. 391 The international law prohibition against
cruel and inhuman treatment also is an accepted customary
international norm 392 and has been defined as a step below
393
treatment that would constitute torture.
384. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
385. Id. at 884.
386. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1982).
387. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 334.
388. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Art.
5, § 2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.123 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment").
389. G.A.Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Art. 7 (Dec. 16, 1966).
390. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
391. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 364, at 1138 (1985) (noting that official torture is jus
cogens); accord Filitarga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717; see also
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185 (citing authorities for the proposition that the prohibition
against torture is jus cogens).
392. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 (dismissing arguments that the terms cruel and
inhuman treatment are too vague to serve as the basis for actionable misconduct under
international law); see also Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347-49 (M.D.
Ga. 2002) (citing numerous cases and international documents in support of the
proposition that international law prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment)
But see, Aldana v. DelMonte Fresh Produce, N.A. Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.
2005) (arguing that in Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Supreme Court implicitly eliminated
international law claims based on cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment).
393. Xuncax, 866 F. Supp. at 189 (citing to numerous international covenant and cases
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Torture has been defined as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence394 of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It is arguable that the United States government's conduct in
forcing American-Indian children into boarding schools was "based
on discrimination" since American Indians, by virtue of their
"Indianness" were singled out to attend these schools so that the
government could "kill the Indian and save the man." To prove that
the United States government engaged in torture, boarding school
attendees will have to show that government agents intentionally
inflicted harm upon the American-Indian children based upon this
discriminatory motive. The government will undoubtedly argue
that it did not intend to inflict harm upon American-Indian children,
rather its goal was to help them by educating the children with
survival skills they would need in order to live productive lives in
the United States.
However, a close examination of the conduct at issue belies that
argument. Certainly in some cases, children were subjected to
395
torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. In Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
a United States court found plaintiffs stated a claim for torture in
situations in which women were imprisoned for three to ten
months, during which time, they were stripped and bound,
whipped with wire, hung by a pole, severely beaten and tortured to
aggravate the resulting wounds.396 In Xuncax v. Gramajo,397 another
court found that being forced to witness the torture or severe
mistreatment of immediate relatives constituted "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment" in violation of international law. 398 Some of
that find that torture is an aggravated form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment).
394. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717 n.16 (citing 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, 23 I.L.M. 1027

(1984) (TheTorture Convention)).
395. 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
396. Id. at 845-46; see also Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997)

(denying motion to dismiss torture claim based on detainment accompanied by physical
injuries).
397. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass 1995).
398. Id. at 187.
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the conduct found to violate international prohibitions against
torture and cruel and inhuman treatment of adults is exactly the
kind of conduct inflicted upon young American-Indian children. A
1969 Senate Report speaks of children handcuffed to basement
pillars or pipes for up to 18 hours.399 Some children were sexually
abused and were forced to watch the sexual abuse of their
classmates. 400 Some children were whipped with boards and straps
and coat hangars. 401 Nigel Bigpond, a boarding school attendee
recently testified before Congress about young children being
sentenced to solitary confinement, or forced to stand in a corner for
hours upon a time, and if they fell asleep, their heads were banged
into the walls. 402 This conduct is extremely similar to the conduct
deemed torture in Abebe-Jira. Additionally, the 1969 Senate Report
details reports from children of being forced to eat food that was
infested with worms and bugs. 403 Mr. Bigpond testified about
punishments that included deprivation of food and sentences of a
diet of bread and water. 40 4 As discussed in detail in Section II,
children were physically and sexually abused, denied adequate
medical treatment, barred from contacting their families, and forced
to work long hours in dangerous conditions.
Although the
government may argue that this conduct does not rise to the level of
torture or cruel, unusual, inhuman or degrading treatment, that
argument should not prevail. It is important to remember that this
conduct was directed at children, often children as young as 7 or 8
years old. Even if the government could argue that this conduct
would not rise to the level of cruel or inhuman treatment of adult
prisoners, an argument that is open to debate, it should be hard
pressed to make the same arguments when it comes to innocent
children.
3.

Violations of the FundamentalRights of Children

Boarding school attendees also have potential claims based
upon violation of the customary international law which mandates
that all children have the right to adequate nutrition, housing,
recreation and medical services; that children should be protected
against any form of exploitation; that children wherever possible

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

note
note
note
note
note
note

149.
131.
127.
132.
143.
132.
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have the right to grow up in the care and under the responsibility of
their parents, and in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of
moral and material security; that children have a right to an
education which will promote their general culture, and that a child
has a right to preserve his or her national identity and family
relations.
These international law mandates are set forth in
numerous international law declarations, conventions and
convenants, including: the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the
Child,405 the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child,406
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,407 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular,
articles 1, 7, 20, 23 and 24)408 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular articles 1 and
10)409 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (in particular,
4
articles 12, 15 and 26). 10
As described in great detail in section II, the boarding schools
violated each of these rights. They attempted to strip children of
their national identity, they purposefully interfered with family
relations, and they tried to alienate children from their families. The
boarding school food, housing and medical care were grossly
inadequate. The boarding school atmosphere was about as far from
loving as one can get - in fact, Senate Reports deemed the schools
militaristic and, as late as the 1960s, captured children (AWOLs)
were treated in much the same harsh way as the military treats
captured AWOLs. 411 The schools' tolerance of teachers and staff
who were known abusers and pedophiles clearly violates not only
the mandate that children be placed in loving environments, but
also the mandate that children be free from any form of
exploitation. 412
405. Declaration on the Rights of the Child (Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the
Child of 1924, adopted Sept. 26, 2004, League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21, at 43).

406. G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/14354 (Nov. 20, 1959).
407. G. A. Res. 44/25, at 167, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(Nov. 20, 1989) (entered intoforce Sept. 2, 1990).
408. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.

171 (entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992).
409. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,1976), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
410. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 334.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.

412. See Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, supra note 406 at
subsection 4 (The child ... must be protected against every form of exploitation);
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV) of Nov. 20 1959, principles 2,
9; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, at 167, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (noting in the Preamble that the need to extend
particular care to the child has been stated in numerous Declarations as well as "in the
statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations
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The main substantive response to the arguments regarding
violations of international laws with regard to the care and
treatment of children may be that all of the rights set forth above are
Instead, they are
not actually customary international law.
aspirational rights that are too indefinite to constitute rules of
international law. 413 Further, to the extent they are specific
mandates, they are mandates that have evolved but were not in
place at the time most children attended American Indian boarding
schools.
The specific and horrific misconduct in boarding schools,
described in section II, supra, was not a violation of vague
aspirational statements, but rather was a violation of basic
international customary law norms that hold that countries should
not deliberately starve children, withhold medical treatment from
children, condone the physical and sexual abuse of children, or take
children from their parents in order to impose a different culture
upon the children. Those are not aspirational ideals, nor are they
"new" ideas or of "recent evolution." For evidence of this, one need
only look at the 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child
which stated that:
(2) The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must
be nursed...
(4) The child.., must be protected against every form of
exploitation;.. 414
Thus, as early as 1924, the international community explicitly
recognized that children were entitled to special consideration and
certainly should not be tortured, starved, beaten or sexually abused.
4.

Other PotentialInternationalLaw Claims

Depending upon the facts of individual cases, there are other
potential international law claims available to boarding school
attendees. For example, to the extent that some boarding schools
forced children to work to support the schools or were "outed" into
white communities to perform menial labor tasks at low or no pay,
concerned with the welfare of children"). For a description of the schools' toleration of
known abuses, see supra Part II.G.
413. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (2004) (noting that any claims for violations of
international law norms must be based upon norms with definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations).
414. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, supra note 405.
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those individuals may have claims for violation of international
5
laws prohibiting forced labor.41
In addition to the substantive claims outlined above, those who
were subjected to the boarding school system have a claim under
international law for the government's failure to redress wrongs. As
acknowledged by Kevin Gover, the Assistant Secretary of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs in 2000, the government's deliberate
destruction of American Indian culture and its peoples, and in
particular emotional, psychological, physical and spiritual
brutalization of American-Indian children entrusted to its care has
created a trauma of shame, fear and anger that has passed from one
generation to the next. This trauma manifests itself in the rampant
alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence that continues to
plague American Indian nations.416 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 8, provides: "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law." 417 In fact, the principle of right to redress for an
internationally recognized wrong has been recognized before World
War II. This principle has been incorporated into both treaties and
international legal opinions. 418 To state the obvious, the United
States has failed to provide any redress to boarding school attendees
harmed by the government's boarding school policies and conduct.
Thus, the arguments set out by scholars seeking redress for those

415. See, e.g., Doe v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, *1 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (holding that young Indian women who were brought to the United States on false
promises they would be provided an education and employment opportunities, but then
were forced to work long hours for grossly substandard pay, and who were physically
and sexually abused, and were threatened and exploited because of their youth, fear,

caste status, poverty, unfamiliarity with the American legal system and inability to
speak English stated a valid claim that the defendants' conduct violated international
law prohibitions against forced labor, debt bondage and human trafficking).
416. For a discussion of the inter-generational harms caused by the boarding schools,
see supra Part II.H.; for the text of Mr. Gover's statement see supra text accompanying
note 175.

417. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 334 at Art. 8
418. See Karen Parker and Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's WIVI Rape
Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 524-28 (1994) (discussing various cases
and treaties which find that international law provides a right to compensation and

arguing that this right applies to 50 year old claims brought by WWII Japanese comfort
women); see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregardfor International
Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians - A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV.
275, 312 (1998) (noting that scholars have found the right to redress an international

wrong is a fundamental principle of customary law that pre-dates WWII and which has
been incorporated into international treaties and opinions and arguing that Japanese
Peruvians interned by the United States government during WWII are entitled to bring
suit 50 years later to seek redress).

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

injured by governmental policies in WWI1419 apply equally
forcefully to boarding school attendees.
5.

Defenses to InternationalLaw Claims

In addition to the substantive defenses set forth above, the
government likely will raise the defense of statute of limitations and
the political question doctrine. Those defenses are discussed below.
a.

Statute of Limitations

The government likely will argue that boarding school
attendees' claims are all barred by the statute of limitations.
Boarding school attendees have numerous arguments available to
counter this defense. First, although the United States is not a party
to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 420 the Convention
arguably reflects customary international law.421
Thus one
argument to overcome a statute of limitations defense is that
customary international law has abrogated this defense in cases in
which the issue is one of crimes against humanity.
In addition to arguing that the Convention on the NonApplicability of the Statute of Limitations does not apply to it
because it is not a signatory, the government may argue its
inapplicability because the Convention refers to criminal
prosecutions rather than tort liability.422 However, the principles
underlying the convention, which include, "the prevention of crimes
against humanity and the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the
furtherance of cooperation between peoples and the promotion of
international peace and security" 423 - are served by tort claims 424 as
419. Id.
420. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, at 40, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, 23rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26, 1968).
421. See Saito, supra note 418, at 314 (noting that the Convention on the NonApplicability of the Statute of Limitations reflects international law principles that when
it comes to crimes against humanity, there should be no statute of limitations).
422. See Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
Convention did not apply to a Bivens claim).
423. See Preamble to Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statute of
Limitations, supra note 420.
424. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
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well as by criminal prosecutions. Thus, the principles underlying
the convention should be applied in tort claims.
Another argument boarding school attendees may assert is that
failing to provide redress is a harm in itself and thus there is an ongoing harm for which the statute of limitations has not run. This is
the argument made by Professor Saito in the case of JapanesePeruvian detainees, 425 an argument which equally applies to the
boarding school attendees, because the United States has "an
ongoing responsibility to compensate the victims, the United States
is engaging in an ongoing violation by failing to do so and in that
respect, even if a statute of limitations did apply, it would not have
426
begun to run."
It also is arguable that the statute of limitations has not run
because the harm - the destruction of the American Indian peoples
and culture - is an ongoing harm. This is actually two distinct
arguments. The first argument is that the harm is ongoing because
of the inter-generational effects of the trauma. 427 The second
argument is that the destruction of the American Indian peoples and
culture is an ongoing harm perpetuated by the American
428
government's policies and their results.
b.

Political Question Doctrine

When faced with claims that the U.S. government has violated
international law, it is common for the government to assert, and the
courts to uphold a "right" of the executive and/or legislative
branches to engage in unilateral action. 429 Thus, the government
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (arguing that constitutional
tort actions are an effective deterrent to government misconduct).

425. Saito, supra note 418 at 312.
426. Id.
427. See supra Part II.H. (discussing the impact and intergenerational impact of the
trauma induced by boarding school attendance).

428. For information about the ongoing harm caused by the government's reservation
and other policies that have led to over 100 years of abject poverty and the problems that
accompany such poverty, see, for example, Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An
Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713,
717 (1986) (noting that the death and disease rates amongst American Indians are
significantly higher than the national average); also see Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 123

(2004) (noting that "Native Americans are 670% more likely to die from alcoholism,
650% more like to die from tuberculosis, 318% more likely to die from diabetes and 204%
more likely to suffer accidental death when compared to other groups").

429. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903) (asserting Congress has
plenary authority over Indians and the abrogation of a treaty is a political question over
which the courts have no authority); for an excellent critique of the plenary power and

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

may assert that the conduct at issue constitutes a "political
question" 430 best left to the discretion of the executive, or that the
executive branch has plenary authority 431 to disregard otherwise
applicable constitutional rights or international law in its dealings
with American Indian nations. Both of these are judicial doctrines
which have allowed the courts to avoid "interfering" with the
actions of the "political" branches of government, but which
constitute illegitimate defenses in this context. First, it is a
fundamental principle of international law that a country's domestic
law may not be invoked to avoid its obligations under international
law. This was the primary lesson of the Nuremberg Tribunals. 432
In the context of the boarding school cases, the assertion of both
the plenary power and political question defenses amounts simply
to an assertion that "might makes right," that the government has
the power to exercise arbitrary and even unlawful power over
American Indian nations and their children. The justification for
these doctrines is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
or legislative branches of government in their conduct of foreign
affairs, or in matters of national security. To attempt to use them to
avoid responsibility for governmental actions undertaken with
respect to peoples within the United States' border, over whom the
United States has exercised complete authority, is not only
433
disingenuous, but subverts the basic principles of the rule of law.
In sum, plaintiff's have colorable arguments to counter both
statute of limitations and political question defenses. Plaintiffs may
argue that customary international law prohibits a statute of
limitations defense in these cases. Alternatively, plaintiffs could
argue the statute of limitations has not run both because the
government failed to provide redress and because there is an

political question doctrine as they have been applied to American Indian claims, see
Newton, Federal Power, supra note 198.

430. The political question doctrine allows a federal court that has jurisdiction over a
dispute to decline to adjudicate it on the ground that the case raises questions that
should be addressed by the political branches of government. The government's
argument, in essence, would be that the institution of the schools and their management
was an executive branch policy decision and the court should not interfere with that
decision both because it would be second-guessing the executive branch's conduct and

because it would indicate a lack of respect for the executive branch's conduct. The test
for determining whether a case presents a political question is set out in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
431. For a brief discussion of the plenary power doctrine in relation to the boarding
school cases, see discussion supra Part III.A.2.

432. See supra text accompanying notes 351-52.
433. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 364, at 1167-75 (arguing there is no domestic authority
to violate jus cogens norms and that the political question doctrine is inapplicable in cases

alleging a violation of fundamental international law norms).
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ongoing harm to the American Indian peoples caused by the schools
and other government policies. Finally, plaintiffs also should
contend that the political question doctrine does not extend to these
cases since that doctrine was intended to give Congress and the
Executive branch power over the conduct of foreign affairs and
matters of national security, and the boarding school claims cannot
be categorized either as a matter of foreign affairs or of national
security.
IV. Canada's Attempt to Address Boarding School Abuses
Canada and the United States share the horrific boarding school
legacy - both countries engaged in attempts to strip indigenous
people of their culture and sense of self-worth, both established
boarding schools that housed pedophiles and abusers, both took
children from their families and placed them in institutions where
they were deprived of decent food, shelter, medical care, and the
chance to grow up in a loving environment. 434 Unlike the United
States, Canada at least is attempting to address and compensate the
435
thousands of American Indian boarding school victims.
Following an in-depth investigation of the history of boarding
schools, their psychological effect and potential legal remedies, the
Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) issued
an extensive report which served as the basis of a four-part
government framework aimed at addressing the legacy of the
boarding schools. 4 3 6
The framework included a government
apology; $350 million in government funds devoted to a nongovernmental agency set up to provide funding for communitybased healing projects; and various structures designed to facilitate
settlement of the claims. 437 These structures include ADR processes
and out-of-court negotiations with an agency whose mandate is to
settle as many claims against the government as possible. 438 The
434. See generally CHURCHILL, supra note 48 (discussing both United States and
Canadian boarding schools).
435. See generally Jennifer Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Boarding School
Abuse in Canada: Litigation, ADR and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 253 (2002)
(discussing Canada's attempts at redressing some of the harm caused by its schools).
436. REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (1996) [hereafter RCAP],
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgnun-e.html (last visited Sept. 27,

2006).

For a discussion of the extensive study involved in compiling the report, see

Pamela O'Connor, Squaring the Circle: How Canada is Dealing with the Legacy of Its Indian
Residential Schools Experiment, 28 INTL. J. LEGAL INFO. 232, 233-38 (2000).
437. See RCAP, supra note 436, Appendix A (summarizing the recommendations).
438. See generallyLlewellyn, supra note 435 (discussing the Canadian ADR process).
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cases mainly are proceeding on claims for sexual or physical abuse,
claims which do not present a significant statute of limitations issue
because most Canadian provinces either have adopted statutes
which abolish any limitation period for actions based upon sexual
misconduct or have adopted a discoverability rule.439
The Canadian solution is an imperfect one. It does not address
claims based upon the loss of language and culture or the effects of
the extreme institutional neglect. There have been numerous
complaints about the time it takes to settle claims, as well as the
amount of compensation. 440 Moreover, the generations of harm
cannot be repaired by the small steps taken by the Canadian
government. Despite these issues, Canada is light years ahead of
the United States in attempting to address, and provide redress for,
the devastation caused by the boarding school system. 441 Thus the
United States boarding school attendees should look to the
Canadian cases for model complaints, discovery requests and for
information about other issues that may arise in litigation in United
States courts.
The United States government should look to Canada for ideas
on how to begin to address this issue. For example, following
Canada's example, the United States should first set up a
Commission to study and report on what was done to the children
in the American Indian boarding schools, and the impact that this
has had upon the American Indian peoples. 442 This would be a
starting point for understanding the problems caused by the
boarding schools.
Additionally, to alleviate many of the legal hurdles these claims
now face in the United States' courts, Congress should enact a
special jurisdictional statute allowing claims against the United
439. Jim Davies, Sexual Abuse of Children by Teachers: A Canadian Perspective on Direct
and Vicarious Employer Liability, 11 EDUC. & L.J. 131, 166 (2001-2002) (noting that "the
legislatures of several Canadian provinces have amended their limitation statutes to
incorporate the discoverability rule, while others have abolished any limitation period
for actions based upon sexual misconduct"); see also O'Connor, supra note 436, at 254-56
(discussing the discoverability rule that has been adopted in most Canadian provinces).
440. Llewellyn, supra note 435, at 260-64 (discussing the problems with current
Canadian boarding school abuse litigation).
441. Canada also has done significantly more than Australia, which had its own
boarding school system for its aboriginal peoples. At least one scholar has urged the
Australian government to look to what Canada has done as a way to begin redressing
the harms to the Australian native peoples. See O'Connor, supra note 436.
442. See, e.g., Rhonda Claes and Deborah Clifton, Institutional Child Abuse - Needs and
Expectations for Redress of Victims of Abuse at Native Boarding Schools (Reviewing the:
history of the schools, the types of abuse, the extent and nature of the abuse, the impact
of the abuse and needs of survivors; mediated and negotiated solutions and
recommendations for action in Canada) (a paper prepared for the Law Commission of
Canada, on file with author)
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States government by those American-Indian children who have
suffered either significant physical or emotional harm due to their
years spent at BIA boarding schools. 443 The statute should
specifically state that it is eliminating the government's statute of
limitations defense for civil claims. 444 Alternatively, it could extend
the statute of limitations to five years after the enactment of the
authorizing statute, or could allow a claimant to file claim within a
certain period of time after he or she has discovered that his or her
injuries were caused by boarding schooling experiences. 445 Such a
jurisdictional statute would naturally eliminate any sovereign
immunity, political question or plenary power defense since the
cases would proceed under Congressional authorization. 446 In fact,
ideally, the statute would include provisions for American Indian
nations to sue for the cultural destruction caused by the
government's boarding school policies. 447 Alternatively, Congress
could pay boarding school attendees reparations, something it has
done with Japanese Americans interned during World War 11.448
443. Historically, special jurisdictional statutes waiving sovereign immunity for
American Indian claims were enacted because American Indians could not otherwise
file suit against the government. See Newton, supra note 193, at 770-71.
444. States cannot eliminate statutes of limitations in criminal cases after the statutes
of limitations have expired, because doing so violates ex post facto laws, Stogner v.
California, 539 U.S. 607, 616 (2003) (holding that extending the statute of limitations for
criminal prosecutions of child abuse where the new law revives a cause of action
previously barred by the statute of limitations violates ex post facto laws). However, at
least one court has found Stogner inapplicable to civil cases. DeLonga v. Dioceses of
Sioux Falls, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1102 (D.S.D. 2004) (noting that Stogner recognized a
distinction between civil and criminal cases and that the Supreme Court has, in the past,
defined a violation of ex post facto laws solely in conjunction with criminal and punitive
statutes).
445. For an example of a discovery statute, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:61B(b) (West 2004)
which provides that "[iun any civil action for injury or illness based on sexual abuse, the
cause of action shall accrue at the time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its
causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse. Any such action shall be brought within
two years after reasonable discovery."
446. See, e.g., Ryan v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 n.5 (2001) (noting that in
1994 Congress recently enacted special legislation to allow a child sexually assaulted by
a USPS employee to file suit when the suit otherwise would have been barred under
existing law).
447. The language of the statute would have to be exceedingly clear and strong since
courts, interpreting the Indian Claims Commission statutory provision that allowed for
"claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing
rule of law or equity," have refused to recognize tribal claims for loss of tribal identity
and destruction of tribal existence. See Newton, supra note 193, at 776-84.
448. See Chad W. Bryan, Precedentfor Reparations? A Look at HistoricalMovements for
Redress and Where Awarding Reparationsfor Slavery Might Fit In, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 60304 (2003) (discussing the Congressional grant of reparations to interned Japanese
Americans and the reparations paid by the state of Florida to African Americans in
Rosewood, Florida, whose town was burned by a white mob in 1924 and discussing
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Of course, political realities make it extremely unlikely that the
government will either enact a statute specifically authorizing these
claims or waive its defenses to the claims. Likewise, there is little
chance leaders of this country will agree to other solutions such as
Professor Bradford's idea of reconciliation 449 or Professor Churchill's
idea of decolonization. 450 Nor is it likely that the government will
heed the call for reparations for its genocidal conduct 451 against
American Indians or American Indian boarding school attendees.
Thus, lawyers most likely will have to work under the existing legal
framework in filing these cases. In doing so, they should challenge
the government and the courts to think about how the law can and
should be implemented and conceptualized in order to provide
relief for the horrific and widespread harm the government's
human rights abuses have inflicted, and continue to inflict, upon
generations of American Indian children.
Conclusion
Centuries of genocidal policies, perpetuated by the government
and allowed by the courts, cannot completely be redressed by the
boarding school legal claims discussed herein. Nor can monetary
compensation completely repair the damage that the boarding
school practices and policies inflicted upon individual American
Indians and the American Indian peoples. However, these boarding
school claims, despite the numerous hurdles and challenges they
present, should be pursued.
These cases should be viewed from the perspective that a
fundamental underpinning of the American justice system is that
the purpose of the law is to provide remedies for wrongs. To end
with where we began: as was stated in Marbury v. Madison, "the
current movements to obtain reparations for descendents of African-American slaves).
One excuse used to deny slave descendants reparations is that the government only has
paid reparations to people directly touched by the government's wrong rather than to
remote descendants who were not directly harmed. That excuse - that the damage is too
remote - does not apply to boarding school attendees.
449. Professor Bradford argues for reconciliation with attendant acknowledgment of,
and apology for, the harms caused by 500 years of settler and colonialist policies, repair
of the damage caused through land recovery or in-kind transfers and legal reforms,
compensation and commemoration; all of which may lead to forgiveness and healing.
See Bradford, supra note 7, at 152-72.
450. Professor Churchill argues that decolonization includes, among other things,
restitution in terms of property and jurisdiction, reparations as decided by the
International Court of Justice, and insistence upon an accurate portrayal of United States
history vis-a-vis American Indians. CHURCHILL, supra note 48 at 79-82.
451. Glauner, supra note 370 (arguing for reparations).
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very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection." 452 We cannot responsibly acknowledge the abuses that
have occurred without devising some solution to remedy those
abuses, even if that means changing current interpretations of the
law, making new law, or developing alternative sources for
remedies through legislative or executive branch action.
Although the boarding school claims cannot completely
remedy all the wrongs committed against American-Indian children
and American Indian nations, they can serve valuable purposes.
They can bring this issue into the open and raise public awareness
of the atrocities committed by our government against young
children, much in the same way as the litigation against pedophile
priests has raised awareness of abuses committed by various
churches. The cases can also provide a starting point for the
government to begin to address, and redress, the multitude of
harms caused by its horrific treatment of American Indians. The
cases may help those boarding school attendees involved
understand that the problems they have suffered and continue to
suffer are due to what happened to them rather than to anything
that they have done or not done. 45 3 Finally, this kind of litigation
can be used as an example of how the law can or should redress
large-scale human rights violations.
In the end, lawyers who take on these cases will be taking on
the government and hundreds of years of government policies and
laws developed to suppress avenues of recourse for American
Indians. As with any human rights litigation, lawyers must be
prepared for a long haul and a hard fight. But it is a fight worth
fighting, if only because silence and refusing to challenge the
existing status quo allows genocidal, inhuman, and horrific conduct
to go unpublicized and unpunished.

452. Marbury,5 U.S. at 163.
453. Unfortunately, the litigation process can produce the opposite result government lawyers may try and blame the boarding school attendees for their own
injuries and emotional distress. This litigation strategy, and the psychological effort
involved in bringing the horrors back to the conscious mind, may make some boarding
school attendees decide not to pursue their claims. This valid decision must be
respected, because the process of pursuing these claims can be so devastating. See
Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native American Schools, Amnesty Now,
Summer 2003, 14-16 (2003) (quoting a report that of the first twenty-nine men who
publicly disclosed sexual abuse in Canadian Indian boarding schools twenty-two
committed suicide) (on file with author).
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